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ABSTRACT
An

abstract of the thesis of Agnes Eileen Olsen for' the

Master of Arts in History presented July 7, 1989.
Title:

Robert Francis Kelley and the Eastern European
Division of the State Department:

1917-1933.

This study traces the career of Robert Francis Kelley
and his influence on American-Russian
nonrecognition
examination

period

(1917-1933).

The focus of this

is Kelley's role in formulating,

and sustaining America's
solidified

Relations during the

anti-communist

during the 1920s and 1930s.

implementing,

policy developed
Particular

and

attention

is given to the senate recognition hearing of 1924, Kelley's
training of future diplomats
et al.), and his contributions

(George Kennan, Charles Bohlen,
to the preparations

to the United States' recognition

leading

of Russia in 1933.

Kelley's papers and personal correspondence,

Using

this study

shows the growth of a man and the evolution of a policy.
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INTRODUCTION
This study has been a search
Kelley.

for Robert

Francis

Here, the goal has not been the acquisition

facts but rather
that meaning

the meaning

affected

nonrecognition

of those

-- his official

his collection
diaries

"a scholar

papers

Kelley's

during

the

disappointingly

and "legalistic."

him as "an astute

by instinct

was an elusive

are brilliantly

His contemporaries

"taciturn,"

characterized

writings

of personal

non-existent.

"useful,"

relations

as

(1917-1933).

It has not been an easy task.
personality

facts, particularly

American-Russian

period

of

student

and dedication,"

cold,

thin, his

labeled

him

Historians
of Russian

have
history,"

and "a bureaucratic

genius."
Yet, despite
Kelley's
America's
during

role

the thinness

in formulating,

anti-communist

the 1920's

implementing,

policy,

and early

He has been assigned

paragraph

by almost

Kelley,

historical

the man, has remained

and sustaining
and solidified

a sentence,

of the period.

he has commanded
jUdgments

material,

has not been totally

a phrase,

all historians

has surfaced,

the once-soft

developed

1930's,

ignored.

information

of the available

more

a

As more

space,

have often hardened.

an enigma.

and
Yet

iii
There
student

is nothing

of history

search began.

that whets the curiosity

more than a man of mystery.

The starting

are found Georgetown

Archives,

Eastern

Division

stored.

The papers

of his friends,

were very helpful.

gracious

and gregarious

Harper

A personal

Division,

added to the Kelley mosaic.

further

insights

to those

however

who with

Papers

Poole,

contained

University

of that period

in the

provided

owes a huge debt

fewer available

documents,

It must be stated

its author

The pioneers

of Soviet-American

R. Maddux,

have

--

study has

stood on the shoulders

include:

Robert

Diplomacy;

Agreements;

American-Russian
Thomas

The Dewitt

-- that if the present

it is because

The Roosevelt-Litvinov
Williams,

European

has long attracted

history.

plagiaristically

The Origins

include:

period

such accurate

of such giants.

Dooman

at Columbia

Every student

any merit,

long-time

and background.

scholars,

recreated

with the

chief in the Eastern

and Eugene

The nonrecognition
historians.

of chicago,

interview

Kelley's

and his assistant

are

(FDR Library,

(University

Earl Packer,

Collection

of the

John Wiley

associate

Oral History

papers,

of the state Department

Chicago)

Phillips,

D.C. Here

home of Kelley's

where the documents

Hyde Park, N.Y.) and Samuel

William

Thus the

point was washington,

University,

and the National
European

of the

Donald G. Bishop,

and William

Relations.

Paul Browder,

Appleman

Later studies

Years of Estrangement:

American

iv
Relations

with the Soviet Union;

and Economics;

and John Richman,

soviet union:

The Decision

These

are historians

and it is with
taken

Joan Hoff Wilson,

Ideology

The united

and the

States

to Recognize.
before

whom one stands

a real sense of humility

that this study has

issue with some of their conclusions.

that their

searches

differently.
policy;

and this search

They have sought

study, more narrowly
man in order
nonrecognition

recreate

sUbject.

is always

will develop

America's

this "protective

mother"

dilemma

objectively

communist

stance.

realize

during

sUbject

most

a danger

between

the

of the

when a writer

in this study to avoid

On the other hand,

a 1920s conservative

the agonizing

hoped that

in this circumstance,

with the same humor and goodwill
Behan,

who, while

never

to

would

her.

with her
It is

have reacted

as the Irish playwright,
forgiving

to

that her

disagreed

have disliked
Kelley

attempts

to the writer

of writing

likely would have violently
and would probably

an

and his anti-

little comfort
throes

to

and her

occurs when a 1980s liberal

It offers

attempts

blind personal

that writer

pitfall.

conclusions

Brendan

policy

a

This

has sought to understand

A real effort has been made

intellectual

and explain

to that policy.

the life of a man, that an almost

relationship

focused

of Soviet Russia.

Yet there

analyze

to understand

focused,

to reexamine

It is realized

have been

to them Kelley was incidental

in awe,

his editor

for

v

being English,
with Kelley,

was a big enough man to overlook

one wonders.

This study has attempted
and to explain
measure
author's

the fact.

the evolution

it has succeeded,
fascination

to show the growth

of a policy.

that success

with her subjects.

of a man

If in some small

is due to the

CHAPTER

I

KELLEY FACES BORAH
Even in Washington
page story.

On January

brief paragraphs
"First Hearing

had already

the newspaper

Secretary

"in maintaining

Russia.

Question."

of the subcommittee

committee,

recognition

21, 1924 the Washington

Today on Russian

State Department,
supported

was not a frontPost ran two

on the second page under the heading,

Borah, chairman
Relations

D.C. the hearing

of the Senate

received

of the then six-year-old

Hughes was not expected

but had promised

Foreign

data which

Evans Hughes'

of pronounced

William

data from the

reported,

of State Charles

his policy

Senator

position

opposition"

to

Soviet government

to appear

to send State Department

of

at the hearing
representatives

to

answer ques t'~ons. 1
Subsequent
News of Lenin's

news stories
death crowded

excited
coverage

even less attention.
of the hearings

the front page, and inside it was forced to compete
space with surfacing
the beloved,

reports

recently-deceased

The Washington

Post relegated

page four and headlined

'The Washington

of corruption
president,
its January

the story,

Post, January

off

for

in the cabinet
Warren

of

G. Harding.

22 coverage

"Hughes Transmits

21, 1924, p. 2.

to

2

Documents

to Link Soviets

with Plots.
"Inquiry

New York Times' headline:
Borah."

This story, however,

overpowering

ad for raccoon

Although

uncertainty

over Lenin's

recognize

it

he had been out-

Eventually,

not be resumed

were

the suspension,

the resolution

government

was shelved

it the hopes of the pro-recognitionists.
debate would

next to an

at the time that

death prompted

the soviet Russian

Is Begun by

the hearings

it was intimated

by Hughes.4

the

coats.'

is more likely that Borah realized
maneuvered

on soviet

was positioned

Three days after they began,
suspended.

Borah grabbed

,,2

seriously

to
and with

The recognition

until the advent

of

the Great Depression.
However

obscured

have not entirely

in 1924, the recognition

escaped

the prodding

pens of historians,

who have tended to view them as a disaster
allies and a triumph
though

accurate,

represented

is nevertheless

two powerful

The Washington

•

This analysis,

incomplete.

The hearings
or defeat

in a

men and their rival

Post, January

'The New York Times, January
4

and his.

for Borah and his

much more than a simple victory

battle between

2

for Hughes

hearings

22, 1924, p. 4.
22, 1924, p. 4.

Marlan C. McKenna, Borah, p. 295.
Senator George W.
Pepper, who served on the hearing committee, reported that
the resolution was shelved with "a decent regard" for
Borah's feelings.
Ibid., p. 295. Also see: Peter G.
Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment, pp. 91-92.
Filene writes that the hearing was suspended because of
scandals in Harding's cabinet.

3

philosophies.
American
which

Nonrecognition

foreign policy

for the next nine years,

strong sentiments

communism,

already

into a solidly
significance,
foreign

in 1924 set the course

of suspicion

present

anti-communist
the hearings

service

officer,

Preparation

Robert

1923, when three men of diverse
-- Colonel

and Senator

William

Raymond

the career

background

hardened

of a young

in late April

and colorful

Alexander

Borah -- met to devise

bring about recognition

towards

Kelley.

had begun

Robins,

in

Also of decided

Francis

for the hearings

personality

states,

ideology.

launched

years

and opposition

in the united

of

Gumberg,

a strategy

to

of Soviet Russia by the united

s cat es ."
Robins,
in Russia

an idealist

during

from humble beginnings,

the November

Bolshevik

had been

Revolution

member

of the Red Cross team appointed

by President

Wilson

in July 1917.

courage,

A man of unusual

after the fall of Kerensky's

Provisional

immediately

with Trotsky

forced a meeting

[continue to] serve the Russian
national

interests ... ?",

Robins

5James K. Libbey, Alexander
Relations 1917-1933, p. 112.

as a
Woodrow

Robins,

Government,
to ask, "Can we

people without

injury to our

later served as an

Gumberg

and Soviet-American

'Sister Anne Vincent Meiburger, Efforts of Ravmond
Robins Toward the Recognition of Soviet Russia and the
Outlawry of War, 1917-1933, p. 20. Biographical information
about Robins can also be found in Libbey, Alexander Gumberg,
pp. 7-9; Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment, pp.
27-30; Robert James Maddox, William E. Borah and American

4

intermediary
Francis,

between

and the Bolsheviks,

Lenin and Trotsky
American

Historian

his image of Russia

Robins
determined

returned

either

to the united

program

ignored

and by April

Alexander

from a few

and was lacking

recognition
labeled

in June

1918,

for the Bolshevik
a radical.

This

statement,

"We are engaged

people;

in the task of

not to support

or vilified.

Robins

to Russia

was

Robins was tenacious,

in his optimism

moment

however,

had arrived.

was his friend,

a man often characterized

Gumberg,

II'

the

a Russian-American

as Robins'

New Yorker,

had

in the spring of 1917 as a sales

Foreign Policy, pp. 39-41; William Appleman Williams,
American - Russian Relations 1781-1947, pp. 50, 80-82,
90.
'George F. Kennan,
Meiburger,

8

"By

realities,

either here ...or in Russia ... r

Gumberg,

alter-ego.

states

1923 he felt the opportune

Joining

Kennan wrote,

his

of the Red Scare, a time of near-national

to help the Russian

traveled

George

by contemporary

only to find himself

Robins'

Bolshevik

than any other

perspective.'"

was the period
hysteria.

to be closer to

in late 1917 had been gained

to gain official

government,

David R.

Robins was not without

and diplomat
absorbed

program

but brief and recent experiences

in historical

seeking

and was thought

at that time.

a person wholly

intensive

ambassador,

and the Bolshevik

in Russia

detractors.
nature

the American

Efforts

Russia

Leaves the War, p. 63.

of Raymond

Robins,

p. 62.

89-

5

representative
severed

for several American

his business

translating

business

firms.

He soon

ties in order to devote his energies

for the many

foreign journalists

assigned

to

to

Russia.9
Gumberg
historians.

remains

the sUbject

His biographer,

sharp issue with Kennan's
return to Russia
months,

indicates

statement

that Gumberg,
of himself

of two societies,

Gumberg

sympathetic

their basic differences.

among

has taken
upon his

in those

citizen.,,10 Libbey writes,

quite the opposite ....

interpreter
accepting

James K. Libbey,

in 1917, "thought

as a Russian

of some controversy

"The record

became

the

to both, yet

Gumberg

was able to

exist in two dimensions.,,11
Gumberg's

wit was often sarcastic

easily.

The usually

tenderhearted

Gumberg

the pseudonym,

"Trusishka"

and he made enemies

John Reed assigned
(which means

"coward"

Russian)

in his book, Ten Days That Shook the World."

whatever

differences

personality

scholars may have concerning

and motivations,

in

But

Gumberg's

they agree that he was an

9Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 65; Meiburger,
Efforts of Raymond Robins, p. 22. Biographical information
about Gumberg can be found in Maddox, William E. Borah, p.
198; Libbey, Alexander Gumberg; Williams, American-Russian,
pp. 110-11; Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment, pp.
88-89.

IOKennan, Russia

Leaves the War, p. 66.

"Libby, Alexander
"Ibid., p , 19.

Gumberg,

p. 18.

6

indefatigable

worker

reconciliation
become

in his efforts

between

"a critical

America

would unite with the highest
America,

Senator

William

a

By 1923 he had
the pUblic

It was only natural
profile

that he

pro-recognitionist

and an individualist

by birth,

an Idahoan

by tradition.

he may have owed to one of his paternal

ancestors,

a German nun who left her convent

His gift of oratory

it was said that he addressed

apparently

by

His independence

of thought

Luther.

in

Borah."

Borah was an Illinoisan
choice,

and Russia.

figure in coordinating

for recognition. ,,'3

campaign

to mediate

to marry Martin

developed

the farm animals

early

in both

and Latin exp Let.Lves v"

poetry

Following
America's

outraged

administration:
of making

the Bolshevik
reaction,

Revolution

in 1917 and

Borah cautioned

"It would be well to modify

the world safe for democracy.

,,16

the Wilson
our pretensions

In 1919 he

Ibid., p. 103.

13

"Ibid., p. 104; Borah's career has been a popular
subject of historians.
See: Marian C. McKenna, Borah;
Robert James Maddox, William E. Borah and Foreign Policy;
LeRoy Ashby, The Spearless Leader, Senator Borah and the
progressive Movement in the 1920's; Claudius o. Johnson,
Borah of Idaho; John Chalmers Vinson, William E. Borah and
the outlawry of War.
For a contemporary view see: Walter
Lippmann, "Concerning Senator Borah," Foreign Affairs,
January 1926, Vol. IV, 2, pp. 211-222.
1~addox, William E. Borah and Foreign
McKenna, Borah, p. 12.
'~addox,

William

E. Borah and Foreign

Policy,

p. xiv;

Policy,

p. 34.

7

attacked

America's

position

that the Russian

establish

a socialistic

republic.""
America
battle

intervention

It was Gumberg
Along with Robins
of Indiana,

Russian

situation

effects

nonrecognition

17 I

who arranged

government

a meeting

in Russia,

critic

leader

the April,

Their

of

in the

1923, meeting.

immediate

officials

Goodrich

a detailed

outlining

goal was to

that the existing

with President

had already

there and stressing

and particularly

a

of the Soviet government.

Robins was to prepare

current

press,

to act as a vigilant

needed to be revised.

the task of arranging

farmers.

state as we have to establish

James P. Goodrich."

policy

interests

have the same right to

and Borah, he invited the former governor

the highest

Harding.

"I take the

and became the congressional

for recognition

convince

people

Borah continued

policy

in Russia:

was assigned
Warren

memorandum

on the

the detrimental

caused to American

the need for increased

trade,

the aid this would render to American

Meanwhile,

Borah was to rouse support

around the country,

and in Congress.

among the

Gumberg

was to

bOd
~ ., pp. 43-44.

"Libbey, Alexander Gumberg, p. 112. James P. Goodrich
was from Indiana, a grain-growing state.
He was concerned
with the farmers and felt recognition of the Soviet
government would open grain exports to Russia.
See:
Meinburger, Efforts of Raymond Robins, pp. 73, 77-78;
Libbey, Alexander Gumberg, pp. 79-81, 95-98.

8

organize

an "Unofficial

would visit Russia

Congressional

commission"

during the summer of 1923."

In May 1923, Robins wrote a memorandum
urged a "review of the policy determining
relations."
critical
between

His justification

conditions
Russia

be unsound
economic

of America

On May 31, Robins
Goodrich.

for this review was "the

now existing

and "a continuing

"Enclosed

in the economic

and growing

menace

lunched

Harding

with a letter to

find draft of suggestions

that at this meeting,
confidential
warranted

During the luncheon,

Noted historian

William

Harding

trip to Russia"

recognition,"

Appleman

authorized

Harding

agreed

and Mrs.

Russia

Williams

Robins

and, if Robins

for a

relations.""

at the White House with President

on June 2, 1923.

discussed.

to the

and the peace of the world. ,,20

letter to the big chief upon Russian-American
Robins

relations

which he felt to

sent the memorandum

please

in which he

Russian-American

and the rest of the world,"

welfare

which

was
claims

to make "a

felt "conditions

"to reopen the

'9Libbey,
Alexander Gumberg, pp. 109-110.
The
commission included Congressman James A. Frear of Wisconsin,
Senators Edwin F. Ladd of North Dakota and William H. King
of Utah.
Upon their return, they were unanimous in their
call for renewed trade relations with Russia, p. 112.

2~eiburger,

Efforts

202-206.

2'Ibid., p , 202.

of Raymond

Robins,

Appendix

C, pp.

9

[Russian]

question.

other historians
Anne Vincent
writes

have restated

Meiburger,

that "Harding

question
Libbey,

Using Williams'

,,22

Williams'

assertion

interesting

Gumberg,

Western

because,

trip, Harding

his vice president,

evidence

while

on August

influenced

issue with
thesis

is

is not

interesting,

died and was succeeded

becomes
his

in office by

Calvin Coolidge.

hopeful.

fresh, but they were

They believed

than Harding

the anti-communist

James

,,23

2, 1923, during

Once again the group started
increasingly

the Russian

"While Williams'

existing

supportive.,,24 This argument,
inconsequential

openly takes

sister

the event,

from the West.

and writes,

and logical,

in recounting

to reconsider

until he should return
in Alexander

as evidence,

the same finding.

however,

declined

research

Coolidge

by the two strongest

nonrecognition

Hoover.

architects

-- Hughes

and the

of Commerce,

respected

Borah and often invited him to the White House to
Then, on December

invited to have lunch with Coolidge,

22Williams,
American-Russian
William E. Borah cites Williams
same statement, p. 200.

Meiburger,

23

Efforts

24Libbey, Alexander

liked and

1, 1923, Robins was

and they discussed

the

Relations, p. 204. Maddox,
as his authority for the

of Raymond
Gumberg,

Coolidge

of

Secretary

listen to his views.

Herbert

policy

would be less

Robins,

p. 113.

p. 89.

10

Russian

question

Gumberg,

for two hours.

"I felt Coolidge

On December

propose

cherished

he offered

interpreted

to barter

later to

was really eager to act. ,,25

6, 1923, Coolidge

of the Union message,
what was widely

Robins wrote

did act.

In his state

to the soviet Government

as an olive branch.

away for the privilege

rights of humanity,"

"I do not

of trade any of the

he stated:

But while the favor of America is not for sale, I
am willing to make very large concessions for the
purpose of rescuing the people of Russia.
Already,
encouraging evidences of returning to the ancient
ways of society can be detected.
But more are
needed.
Whenever there appears any disposition to
compensate our citizens who are despoiled, and to
recognize that debt contracted with our Government,
not by the Czar, but by the newly-formed Republic of
Russia, whenever the active spirit of enmity to our
institutions is abated; whenever there appears [sic]
works meet for repentance; our country ought to be
the first to go to the economic and moral rescue of
Russia.
We have every desire to help and no desire
to injure.
We hope the time is near at hand when we
can act.26
To the pro-recognitionists
conciliatory
prepared
cabled

and they responded

this message
immediately.

sounded
Robins

a soft reply for the soviet government

to Moscow. 27 They were aware that Hughes

greatest

obstacle.

Robins

26

"Hughes and Gompers

to Gumberg,

which was
would be the

will do all in their

Ibid., p. 115.

26Papers relatinq to the Foreign Relations of the United
States (hereafter cited FRUS) , l:December 6, 1923, State of
the Union Message.
27Meinburger, Efforts

of Raymond

Robins,

p. 94.

11
power to prevent

the success

of these negotiations,"

Robins

wrote Cumberg:
Only by a more willing spirit on the part of the
soviet leaders ...can we make good on this opening.
I am bringing all the guns I can man into action to
center on Coolidge ....It is indispensable for our
success that we get a favorable response from the
soviet government ...With a generous response ...we
can win.28
On December
for Foreign

Affairs,

which expressed
establish
government
humble,

16, C. M. Chicherin,
sent a telegram

[of the] united

the Soviets

offered

"mutual nonintervention"

recognized
renewal

with

states."

to Coolidge,

willingness

"to

[the] people

and

to open negotiations

in internal

affairs

but not
based on

and stated that

should be

in order "to bring about the desired

of friendship

Commissar

Conciliatory

claims of both governments

The message

end of

with the U.S."",

was received

December

Evan E. Young, head of the Division
Affairs

directly

the Soviet government's

at last firm friendship

the financial

the Soviet

of the State Department,

17.

That same day,

of Eastern

European

sent a letter to Hughes.

I venture to suggest that a reply be made by
you .... It seems to me that our reply should be brief
and concise and of a nature which will not invite
negotiations or further communications unless the
Soviet authorities are, in fact, prepared to accept
28Rob ins to cumberg,
December 1, 1923, quoted in
Mieburger, Efforts of Raymond Robins, p. 94. Samuel compers
was president of the American Federation of Labor and a
leading nonrecognitionist.
See letter:
Compers to Hughes
FRUS, 1923, Vol. II, July 9, 1923, pp. 758-760.

"'FRUS, 1:1923, p. 787.
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in full our three fundamental
conditions.30
Young's

letter has been largely

a fact which has obscured
European
states'

Division
policy

Hughes
December

and essential

the importance

and its profound

concerning

swiftly

ignored by historians,
of the Eastern

influence

on united

Russia.

responded

18, he sent Chicherin

to Young's
a brusque

suggestion.

On

reply:

There would seem to be at this time no reason for
negotiations.
The American government, as the
President said in his message to the Congress, is
not proposing to barter away its principles.
If the
Soviet authorities are ready to restore the
confiscated property of American citizens or make
effective compensation, they can do so.
If the
Soviet authorities are ready to repeal their decree
repudiating Russia's obligations to this country and
appropriately recognize them, they can do so.
It
requires no conference or negotiations to accomplish
these results which can and should be achieved at
Moscow as evidence of good faith.
The American
government has not incurred liabilities to Russia or
repUdiated obligations.
Most serious is the
continued propaganda to overthrow the institutions
of this country.
This government can enter into no
negotiations until these efforts directed from
Moscow are abandoned."

30Evan
E. Young to Secretary of state Hughes, December
17, 1923, U.S. Department of State, National Archives
(hereafter cited as DSNA) , Record Group 59, File 711.61/71.

"FRUS, 2:1923, p. 788. Whether Hughes sent the message
before or after consulting Coolidge remains unclear.
There
is a typed copy of the statement in the State Department
files, dated December 18, 1923, with some hand-written
corrections along with a note at the bottom in Hughes'
handwriting which reads:
"Read by the President and
approved by him--December 18, 1923.
CEH."
There is also a
letter of the same date from Hughes to the President which
reads:
"I enclose a copy of the statement which I have
given to the press."
There are no notations by Coolidge on
either document.
DSNA Record Group 59, File 711.61/71.
Whether or not Hughes acted on his own roused considerable
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Hughes'

telegram

Borah was "dumbfounded"
newspapers

shocked

and returned

and on the Senate

Hughes would be damaged

floor."

was mystified.~

support

his harsh position,

Undoubtedly
Hughes,

a text of instructions

America.

Supposedly

expressed

naively

in an attempt
on December

and purported

president

and the Petrograd

forces of America

the Department

State Department
were swiftly
Hughes

is seeking

vicious

Party of
to have been

Party would

of Justice

as forgeries.

to victimize

19, 1923,

,,35

had assured

"Secretary

country

Executive

Alexander

FRUS, 2:1923,

35

Gumberg,

p , 790.

p. 115.

with a

Secretary

"Maddox, William E. Borah, p. 20; Meinburger,
of Raymond Robins, p. 97.
p , 97.

they

of State

comment at the time and has teased the curiosity
historians since.

~Libbey,

the

of the documents,

the whole

frame up," C. E. Ruthenberg,

"Ibid.,

"conquer

and in the not-distant

of the authenticity

branded

to

the documents

future raise the red flag over the White House.
Although

hoped

of both the Communist

Soviet,

the hope that the Workers'

the proletarian

Robins

in the

to the Workers'

intercepted

issued by G. E. Zinoviev,
International

battle

enough to force his resignation.33

Gumberg

released

the pro-recognitionists.

of

of
Efforts

14
the Workers'

Party, wired the state Department

on December

20.36
Borah lashed back at the state Department
an article

published

in the New York Times on December

1923, he argued that the question
was one of a choice between
Peace ....Our people

of Russia's

"World Militarism

In
30,

recognition
or World

can and will easily withstand ...

propaganda ...our people
War.

forces.

cannot well withstand

another

World

,,37

On January
Borah debated

7, 1924, Senator

Henry Cabot Lodge and

the issue on the Senate

that the Soviet government

floor.

Lodge argued

was making:

efforts to cause disorder and dissension among the
American people, ..which if successful would result
ultimately in the radical alteration and perhaps the
destruction of our present form of constitutional
government. 38
Borah, quoting

Henry Clay, argued that "recognition

imply approval

of the character

recognition

that a government

of the government

but rather

exists. ,,39 Borah continued:

I am not interested in communism, I am not
interested in socialism .... I do not believe
either one of them; but I look beyond that
36Ruthenberg to Hughes,
Group 59, File 711.61/73.

did not

December

20, 1923.

in

DSNA, Record

"New York Times, December 30, 1923, reprinted in
Congressional Record, Vol. 65, Part 1, 68th Congress, 1st
Session, January 7, 1924, pp. 583-585.
38Congressional Record, Vol. 65, Part 1, 68th Congress,
1st Session, p. 592, January 7, 1924.
3'Ibid., p. 615.
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proposition.
I wish to see if it is possible to
adopt a course and a policy which will tend to
minimize, destroy, and eliminate both theories.
There is just one form of government in which we
here believe, in which I believe and that is the
blessed old Republic.
I believe ...that the best
way to maintain American principles is to extend
the doctrine of Americanism in so far as we can by
precept and example.
outlawry of a nation
accompl ishes nothing. 40
Borah appended
including

several

documents

two letters written

John W. H. Crim.

by Assistant

Dated November

1923, the letters were written
communists
Act.

in America

Crim wrote,

Department
communist

headlined,

in answer to requests

with reference

that

under the Logan

a concrete

statement

of

replies made clear that the Justice

in America

of violating

of soviet

It was Hughes'

to convict

any

this act.

9, 1924, the waShington

"Evidence

crim Says.""

4,

to this act, but not

did not have enough evidence

On January

General

"There has been a great deal of 'slush'

one single person has submitted
crim's

Attorney

13, 1923 and December

should be prosecuted

coming to my attention

facts.""

to his remarks,

Post ran the story,

Plots Against

U.s. Lacking,

turn to be outraged.

He

4°Ibid., p , 620.
"Crim to Eben W. Burnstead, November 13, 1923; Crim to
Everett P. Wheeler, Esq., December 4, 1923, reprinted in
Congressional Record, Vol. 65, Part 1, 68th Congress, 1st
Session, January 7, 1924, p. 621. The Logan Act forbids a
citizen to correspond privately with any foreign government
or its agents in order to influence its actions towards the
united States.
"Washington

Post, January

9, 1924.
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immediately

sent a "Personal

Attorney-General

and Confidential"

Harry M. Daugherty.

letter to

"I hope ...you will be

able to give a line to the press at once," he wr·ote.
then suggested

He

a statement:

Apart from the question of prosecutions or of
technical requirements to meet the provisions of
particular statutes, it should be clearly understood
that the Department of Justice has abundant evidence
to support the position of the Department of state,
with respect to communist propaganda, directed from
Moscow in this country. 43
On January
wrote,

"Hughes' Anti-soviet

General.""
Moscow

10, Daugherty

Charges

The Washington

"Daugherty

This serves as an example

the State Department

Post

Backed by Attorney

The New York Times wrote,

Propaganda.""

importance

obliged.

attached

Confirms
of the

to the impending

hearing.
The hearing
1924.

outside,

aggravated
lingered

convened

it was intensely

numerous

around

chimney

10 degrees

"Harry M. Daugherty,
Tragedy, pp. 208-209.
"Washington

on the morning
cold.

of January

Northwest

21,

winds

fires, and the temperature
all day.

The Inside story of the Harding

Post, January

10, 1924.

"New York Times, January 10, 1924.
In his book, The
Inside Story, Daugherty writes, "Mr. Hughes was grateful to
me for the services I had rendered the Department of State
and at the next Cabinet meeting he pressed my hand and said,
'You're a brick.'" p. 209.
Daugherty, who would soon be
forced to resign because of his part in the Harding
scandals, was bitterly anti-communist.
See pp. 210-214.
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Inside,
Division
F.

of the state Department,

Kelley,

statement
Kelley

Evan E. Young, Chief of the Eastern

is the Russian

give you the contents
translate

[of the documents]

government

anything

of Russia.

11'7

a brief
"Mr.

and he will

and will be able to

you desire. "," These

"are submitted

Party controls

Robert

his assistant:

expert of the division

Young continued,

communist

After reading

Young introduced

from the Russian

documents,
Russian

and his assistant

faced a panel of Senators.
from Hughes,

European

what

to show that the

is known as the Soviet

Young then turned the presentation

over to Kelley.
The individual
State Department's
indomitable
been hastily
September

Borah.

who had been chosen to present

case appeared

no match

the

for the

Not quite thirty years old, Kelley had

summoned

to the Eastern

European

26, 1923, from his post in calcutta,

Division

on

India."

'"Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, united States Senate, sixty-Eighth
Congress, First Session, January 21, 22, 23, 1924.
Pursuant
to S. Res. 50 Declaring That The Senate of the united States
Favors The Recognition of the Present Soviet Government of
Russia.
(Hereafter cited:
Hearings: Recognition of
Russia), p. 2.
"Ibid.,

p. 2.

"Kelley had been assigned to Calcutta in November 1922.
Although unhappy with the post, he had prepared such
excellent reports that letters of commendation had been sent
to both the Department of Commerce and the Department of
state.
Letters and reports in Robert F. Kelley Papers,
Georgetown University, Washington, D. C. (Hereafter cited as
Kelley Papers).

18
Although
was well
Russian

Kelley was a newcomer

informed
history,

to do research

on Russia.

At Harvard

literature,

in Russia

to the department,
he had studied

and language,

and had planned

and write his dissertation

crimean

War.

dream.

Kelley ended up in the army as a military

and observer
There,

The Bolshevik

assigned

Revolution

on the

had shattered

border

1922, Kelley's

view of the Bolsheviks

crystallized.

He witnessed

attache

between

1920 and

and of communism

the "terrible

economic

caused by a "brutal regime

of terror

governmental

suppression."

the peasant

"deceived

masses,

their eyes."
emigrants,

behind

increased

in intensity."

still hungry,

He viewed

Paradise.

emigrees

,,,49

soldiers

He saw the
open

of the "American

when they saw the reality

He met the cultured

who had left their palaces

and now clung only to their memories.

courageous

and

cold and oppressed,

the reactions

who were terrified

'Socialistic
bewildered

He observed

from the White armies,

first

ruin of

the country"

as "hunger

that

to the Baltic states.

on the Latvian-Russian

uprisings

he

reof

but
and jewels
He interviewed

who were willing

to risk their lives again if only the West would help.
In the end, Kelley became
these people

emotionally

as only an unemotional

attached

man can become

to

attached

"See:
Kelley's Report No. 43, dated April 13, 1921,
"Causes, Progress, and Results of Cronstadt Events" and
Report of Descriptions of Bolshevik Government, September
1922.
Kelley Papers.
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-- with his mind.
committed

He committed

himself

to their history,

during his student
erudite
Though

himself

and literature

It was a commitment

the

scholar would honor all the days of his life.

convictions

in his expressions,

just as passionately

prestige.

from Idaho.

Borah commanded

"He knows what is theatrically

Lippmann,

Kelley held his

as the Senator

At the time of the hearing,

day.

language

days at Harvard.

far less voluble

Walter

to them as he had

one of the best-known

great

effective,"

journalists

wrote

of the

"He has an air of common sense, a resourcefulness,

an eloquence

which have made him the most successful

in the Senate ....For some subtle reason,
enemies

debater

Borah does not make

of his opponents.,,50

Although
the majority

Lippmann's

description

view, Borah's

popularity

was not universal.

[sic] him.

Earl Packer.

"We didn't have any great

We couldn't

We thought

may have represented

"We were agin

say he was unaware

We disagreed

100% with Borah.

vis-a-vis

Russia

he was nuts,"
fondness

wasn't

We wanted

more

recalled

for him.

-- but we couldn't

how a person with his opportunities

country

and

understand

informed.

the best for our

and a lot of other countries.

SOWalter Lippmann, "Concerning Senator Borah,"
Affairs, January 1926, Vol. IV, 2, p. 214.

And

Foreign

20
Borah was not willing

to look at the facts with an open

mind. ,,51
His skill at debate notwithstanding,
initiative

within

unfamiliar

with the simplest

informed.

The following

Borah lost the

the first five minutes.

He was painfully

facts, while Kelley was fUlly

dramatizes

the gap separating

the

two men's knowledge.

Senator

Borah.

the control

You say it [Kelley's

evidence]

of the Soviet Government

shows

by the Communist

Party?
Mr. Kelley.
Senator

By the Russian

Borah.

Would

it shows the control

Communist

it be equally

Party.

true to say that

of the Communist

Party by the

Soviet Government?
Mr. Kelley.
Senator

Borah.

Mr. Kelley.
communist
Senator

No, sir.
Why Not?

Because

the control

is exercised

by the

Party and not by the Soviet Government.

Borah.

If the parties

one has a right to dictate
Mr. Kelley.

are the same, neither

to the other?

But the one has a right to dictate

other, because

to the

our proof will show that the activities

"Interview with Earl L. Packer, Retired, formerly of
the State Department, Division of Russian Affairs (became
Division of Eastern European Affairs October 10, 1922) from
1921-1936.
Interview held February 15, 17, 1989 in New York
City.
(Hereafter cited Packer Interview).

21
of the soviet Government
Communist
Senator
policy

are determined

by the

Party.

Borah.

Did it determine

the new economic

of the Soviet Government?

Mr. Kelley.
Senator

Yes.

Borah.

Mr. Kelley.
Senator

Did not zinoviev

certain

Borah.

Mr. Kelley.
decision

members

oppose that policy?

of the party opposed

Did not Zinoviev

He did not oppose

oppose

dropped

his opposition

Senator

Borah.

it bitterly?

it bitterly;

was made by the political

bureau,

and supported

it.

when the
Zinoviev

Lenin.

And he has continued

to criticize

it

up to this day?
Mr. Kelley.
Senator

No, Zinoviev

Borah.

Mr. Kelley.
Senator

Mr. Kelley.

was simple.
ignored.
the united

You are satisfied

The economic

Communist

plan was as brilliant

and diplomatic

propaganda

presentation

Kelley

had three goals:

Recogni tion of Russia,

as it

issues were

and the national

States were the focal points.

Hearings:

of that, are you?

Yes sir.~

organizational

State Department

52

Are you sure of that?

Yes, sir.

Borah.

Kelley's

has not.

p. 5.

security
and the

of

22
To prove the essential

1.

groups

at Moscow,

unity of the various

whether

Third International,

under the name of the

the Russian

Communist

Party, or the Soviet Government.
2.

To explain

the relationship

and their subordinate

between

groups

those groups

in the united

States.
3.

To demonstrate
groups

the activities

the initiative
stroke,

these goals,

slip from his control.

he introduced

letters

again, Borah was pushed

Borah insisted

of the constitution

was a forgery.

Following
on reading

After the reading,

constitution

read by the Chairman

original

Soviet Republic.

Again

position.

and
Worst

of

the first day's noon

into the record a portion

of "The Union of Socialist

Republics."

never let

that the "Red Flag

into a defensive

all, he was unprepared."

Kelley

In a masterful

confirming

over the White House" document

recess,

States.53

in the united

In order to accomplish

of the subordinate

Kelley

Soviet

said, "The

is the constitution

That is not the constitution

53Ibid.,
p. 59. Also see Maddox analysis
results, Maddox, William E. Borah, p. 207.

"Hearings, Recognition of Russia.
to Harper,
Harpers Papers, University

of the
of

of hearings

Also see: Klieforth
of Chicago.

23

the soviet

Federation,

I have the constitution

which

is the international

of the soviet

Federation

The battle was brief and decisive.
that the soviet Government
dictatorship

recognition

was the de facto government

of Russia,

would have been different.

Instead,

for the regime,

class

simply because
perhaps

he became

based on the proposition

it

the result
an apologist

that positive

changes were occurring

in the Soviet government.

testimony

at the hearing

and evidence

[USSR].,,55

Had Borah admitted

was an atheistic

which deserved

entity ....

destroyed

Kelley's
Borah's

argument.
In a penetrating
written
provokes
Robins,

historian

Peter Filene has

that failure to take up the "amoral"
"the suspicion

that perhaps

et al.] too wanted

democratic

at heart

to recognize

Soviet

regime.,,56

For Kelley,

the Eastern

the hearings

55

analysis,

were a success.

European

argument
[Borah,

only a liberal

Division,

and

and Hughes,

They had put the question

of

bi d
Il.,p.28.

56Filene,
Americans and the Soviet Experiment, p. 92.
Also see: Christopher Lasch, The American Liberals and the
Russian Revolution, p. 217, and Joan Hoff Wilson, Ideology
and Economics, p. 30, footnote 19. It is of some interest
that the reports Borah requested from Hughes were never sent
to the hearings.
(The State Department claimed they were
lost.)
The reports requested were written by William Boyce
Thompson, Col. Raymond Robins, General Graves, Governor J.
P. Goodrich, Major Slaughter and Major Faymonville.
All
these men had sent formal reports in the past to the State
Department which Borah felt supported his position.
See
Borah's request in Congressional Record, Vol. 65, Part 1,
68th Congress, 1st Session, January 7, 1924, p. 626.
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recognition

to rest, at least temporarily,

now be able to concentrate
from Soviet propaganda,
"overthrow
country.

on protecting

and they would

the united

states

which they feared threatened

the political

and economic

structure

to

of the

,,57

On January
commendation:
the manner

25, 1924, Hughes wrote Kelley

"Both the preparation

of presentation,

of the case, as well as

left nothing

I know, both from my own experience,
Mr. Young tells me, how important

a letter of

to be desired,

and

as well as from what

a part you played

throughout. "",
Young's

review of Kelley was no less laudatory.

Kelley possesses

unquestionably

disciplined

mental

"are marked

by an orderly

thoroughness
foregoing

which

outstanding

Packer

57

leaves nothing

to be desired.

unusually

high commendation,

Kelley's

He was, as Young wrote,
students

but

fate was

"One of the few

of Russia ... ,,60 in the country.

Interview,

February
January

17, 1989.
25, 1924, Kelley

59Evan Young to Mr. Eberhardt,
1924, pp. 1-2. Kelley Papers.
.d
1.,p.2.

The

by his work, I can say no less.,,59

"'Hughes to Kelley,

6°lb

His reports

and logical method, ...a

From the date of the hearing,
determined.

fine and well

equipment, ..." he wrote.

is, of course,

judged squarely

an usually

"Mra

Personnel,

Papers.

November

1,
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Unofficially

awarded

state Department,
would be appointed
Affairs.

the title of Russian

it was only a matter

expert

of the

of time until he

Chief of the Division

of Eastern

European

CHAPTER

II

THE FORGOTTEN
state Department
Russia

in 1917.

the Czarist

officials

In March,

government,

MEN

were stunned

revolutionaries

and within

dynasty

emerged

in the form of a provisional

partner"
people

President

for the united

of the united

emotionally,

An untried,

Woodrow

was ill-prepared

complexity

of unfolding

compounded

the escalating
officials
creating
Affairs

entered

diplomatic

responded
a special

-- Russia."

characterized

republic
-- a
as "a fit

While the government
embraced

and

the new order,
the state

in Russia.

Then, on April

the World War, which

Unprepared
disorder,

to manage

6,

only

effectively

state Department

to the crisis on October
section

of

to cope with the speed and

events

the confusion.

unstable

and economically,

Department

states

seized control

government

states joyfully

ideologically

1917, the United

Wilson

states.

in

days the 300-year-old

Romanov

government

vanished.

by events

-- the Division

The section was barely

16, 1917, by

of Near Eastern
functional,

·'This section evolved into the Russian Division (August
13, 1919) and later the Division of Eastern European Affairs
(October 10, 1922).
As the youngest politico-geographic
division, it "didn't rank in the same category as the Latin
American or Western European Divisions.
We had to prove
ourselves as being an important department for matters in
our bailiwick."
Packer Interview, February, 1989.
Also

27

when, on November
in Petrograd
provisional

7, 1917, the Bolsheviks

and formally

were assigned

the officers

which President

Department

already

incomprehensible.
Bolsheviks

called

The rhetoric

reverberating

governments

dictatorship

people,

and

That one

with a population

of

clutches

of a

was simply not to be

not by a president

or a country

a war "to make the world safe for democracy."
facing the officials

was two-fold.
accurate

often confusing
Russia.

advocated

of the proletariat.

was now in the controlling

And certainly

The challenge

obtaining

everywhere,

the

and all the bourgeoisie,

of Europe,

little band of revolutionaries

Division

from the

for an end to the War, preached

of the last great empires

understood.

this second

and the rest of the state

on its face as

of capitalism

urged a universal

140 million

Wilson

had rejected

of legitimate

the destruction

fighting

of the

of the new Russian

the task of comprehending

revolution

overthrow

the overthrow

control

government.

From that moment,
Division

announced

captured

First, was the difficulty

information

on the rapidly

events occurring

Even more

of the Russian

frustrating

of

changing

and

inside the vast country

of

was the fact that once a

see: "Division of Eastern European Affairs," The American
Foreign Service Journal, May-June 1934, pp. 54-61, copy in
Kelley Papers, Georgetown University.
Daniel Yergin,
Shattered Peace, implies that the division was established
as a direct response to the Bolshevik Revolution.
In this
instance, he is in error, pp. 18-19.
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reliable

information

network

had been developed,

officials

found that their recommendations

ignored.

Eventually,

rewarded,

and they became the state Department's

acknowledged

experts

contributions
actions
ground

however,

were

instrumental

rules for the united

states'

rules which translated

of nonrecognition.
division

would

employing
Eastern

only officers

unwritten.
the policy

recognition

one of

served

predecessors
ignored,

they left their

and the department,

for no other, they deserve

which the

in the

and the

inherit and personalize

now, their achievements
Nevertheless,

into a policy

its existence,

Kelley's

the

of Soviet

effectively

field.6' This was the policy

his own high standards.
forgotten

for their

in establishing

who had previously

which Kelley would

The

they set a precedent

follow throughout

European

department

Moreover,

was

relations.

of these men were significant,

and opinions

Russia

were often

their dedication

on American-Soviet

the

with

are largely

their biographies
imprint

on both

and for that reason alone,

at least a brief mention

if

in this

narrative.
Basil Miles was appointed
at the time of its creation.
qualifications

head of the Russian

Miles possessed

of an early twentieth

century

Division

all the usual
united

states

6'Between 1917 and 1934 there were thirty-three officers
assigned to the Russian Division.
Of these, all but seven
had had "field" experience in the Eastern European area.
The American Foreign service Journal, May-June 1934, p. 55.
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diplomat:

a wealthy

eastern

seaboard

Philadelphians,

in Miles'

included

and study abroad,

travel

connections.

case, a fine education,
correct

short stint teaching

secretary

to George von Lengerke,

Russia under President

Theodore

after Von Lengerke's

the Embassy.

departure

Francis

academy

in 1905 as

Miles

to

stayed

in

as Third Secretary

of

63

to Russia

as Special

States

Assistant

in charge of Austro-Hungarian

He surrendered
of the united

these duties
States'

in 1907, then

to Ambassador

and German

in April,

entry into the War.

Root Mission

to Russia.

in Petrograd

was sUfficiently

interests.

Subsequently,

1917, Miles served as Secretary
He predicted

David

1917, as a consequence

May and June

hunger

and social

Ambassador

Roosevelt.

Miles came back to the united
returned

career

which had

(1899-1901),

at a private

(1901-03), Miles had begun his pUblic

Russia

manners

After a brief bout with business

and an equally

personal

family --

in

of the Special

at that time that
severe to be considered

a political

factor which could bring about "the downfall

of

the present

regime and ... possibly

of

Russia

from the war.

,,64

the total withdrawal

After completing

his assignment

with

63Biographical
information about Miles can be found in
William Appleman Williams, American Russian Relations, 17811947, pp. 87, 108; Robert D. Schulzinger, The Making of the
Diplomatic Mind, p. 147.

64The Root
Mission was a goodwill mission headed by the
aged, distinguished, conservative Elihu Root, who had been
appointed by President Wilson.
Its purpose was to encourage
the Provisional Government to continue the Russian War
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the Root Mission,
duties

Miles returned

in the Russian

to Washington

to assume new

Division.

During the two years Miles was chief of the division,
united

States'

relations

considerations

arising

with Russia were

out of the World War.""

considerations,

as later summarized

Poole,

the Bolshevik

included

Central

Powers,

abolition

repudiation

of private

Petrograd,

united

States

attention,
the most

These
and Dewitt

armistice

with the

state loans and

of real estate,

question,

however,

evacuation

was whether

the Bolshevik

that Miles directed

of

the

government.

It

his keenest

and it was upon this proposition

influence.

recognition

revolution,

by

66

should recognize

was to this question

by Kelley

of foreign

ownership

and intervention.

The overriding

"dominated

that he effected

At no time did he favor even de facto

of the Soviet government.

In all probability,

effort.
The group was in Russia part of May and June 1917.
The mission at the time and later was judged to be a dismal
failure.
George Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, pp. 19-24;
also see, William Appleman Williams, American Russian
Relations, 1781-1947.
Williams writes: "Both the final
composition of the mission itself and the directive issued
by Wilson revealed a tragic failure to face the issue in
Russia."
p. 87. Williams exempts Miles from his harsh
criticism.
65Kelley
to Dewitt C. Poole, February 2, 1933, Kelley
Papers, Georgetown university, Washington, DC.

"Poole to Kelley, January 19, 1933; Kelley to Poole,
February 2, 1933, Kelley Papers, Georgetown University,
Washington, DC. This is only a partial list which Poole and
Kelley outlined in preparation for a proposed history of
American-Russian
Relations.

31

his recommendations
was made.
Wilson,

were seriously

The high esteem

who considered

azqumerrt

Secretary

c "

confidence
visitors,

attempted

him "capital,"

interpreted

the rapidly

likewise made

working

influenced

firm "instructions"·

Robins'

return to the united
Robins'

State Department
luggage

"contact"

position

events

in Russia,

for anyone who

Worried

that Ambassador

by Raymond

Robins,

was so pronounced

officials.
searched

Miles
Miles'

that upon

his case to top-level

Miles even arranged

upon his arrival

while Miles opposed

there is some evidence

Williams,

to have

in Seattle. 69

de facto

that he favored

In February

he wrote that "all observers

67William Appleman
p. 108.

who

States, Miles virtually

with the BoLahev i.kav"

to Lansing,

Miles screened

be sent to Francis.

plans to present

Nevertheless,
recognition,

also had great

to bring about recognition,

for Robins'

Robins'

changing

it difficult

disdain

throttled

request,

his position.

Francis might be unduly

suggested

Lansing

this

reports.

to undercut

was actively

supports

of State Robert
At Lansing's

Miles

when policy

in which he was held by President

in Miles.

and prepared

considered

American

1918,

returning

Russian

in a memo
from

Relations,

1781-1947,

68Ibid., p. 137.
69Ibid., p , 146.
70George Kennan,

Russia

Leaves the War, pp. 385-86.
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Russia

seem agreed that the unbending

policy

of holding

absolutely

to this

aloof has been aggravating,

even tended to throw the Bolsheviks
Germans. ,,71

adherence

into the hands of the

In an earlier memo he had suggested

that the

time had come "to deal unofficially"

with all parties

Russia,

This sleight

including

diplomacy

the Bolsheviks.

was as unworkable

led to confusion
unofficially

,,72

as it was dishonest,

for the Americans

of hand
and only

still officially

and

Miles as chief of the division

on October

1, 1919, following

Archangel,

where he had been assigned

Poole had been in Moscow
Revolution,

his return

from Moscow

at the time of the November
bloodless

had been the scene of a bitter

The fighting

had lasted nearly

in grave personal

protected

the Americans

commended

for heroism

and

as Consul General.

which unlike the relatively

in Petrograd,

although

in

inside Russia.

Dewitt Poole replaced

control.

has

danger,

remaining

uprising

battle

for

a week, and

Poole had valiantly
in Moscow.

by the State Department.

He was later
73

"National Archives, state Department File 861. 01j14L
quoted in Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 393.
"George

Kennan,

Russia

Leaves the War, p. 392.

73Ibid.,
p. 74. For more on Poole's activities in
Russia during 1917-1918 see Ibid., pp. 170-183, 447-448,
472. Also see: Williams, American Russian Relations, 17811947, pp. 119, 145, 151. Poole actually served in the
Russian Division from October 1, 1919 until March 20, 1920
when he went on an extended leave of absence.
He returned
April 27, 1921 and served until September 30, 1923.
(Evan
Young was officially appointed chief on July 3, 1923, but
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The son of a military
and his dedication
childhood.

man, Poole's

to public

Speaking

service were

under fire

ingrained

in

of his family, he later recalled

"I grew up in genteel

poverty,

by a sense of the distinction
aware of, I think

courage

compensated
of pUblic

that

for very largely

service.

We were

it's fair to say, a certain well-bred

snobbery,

in that we were, after all, in the aristocratic

tradition

of pUblic

service.""

being an independent
to his upbringing.
by fashions

thinker

of thought.

In describing

outside

In a comparison
echoed observations

Russians
here.

diplomat,

a colleague,

of routine

of Russians

he once

imagination

and was

at a higher

and Americans,

made by Alexis de Tocqueville

"That is the great distinction
and the Americans.

of

a man of charm and

ability ... [but] he lacked

for anything

earlier.

and traced this trait also back

He was often a severe critic

,,75

said, "[He was] a typical

unready

on

"We were not," he said, "very affected

his fellow diplomats.

considerable

Poole prided himself

between

We have terrible

We have to like the same theatres,

level.,,76

Poole
a century
the

social tyranny

movies,

music ....

due to illness was unable to immediately assume his duties.)
The American Foreign Service Journal, May-June, 1934, pp.
54-55.
"DeWitt C. Poole, Oral History Collection, Columbia
University, New York City, p. 4.
(Hereafter cited as
Poole's Oral History.)
75

Ibid.,

p , 4.

"Ibid.,

p. 450.
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Russia,
social

throughout
liberty,

history,

at least up to the Bolshevik

Under Poole's
academic

center

information

tutelage,

of Chicago,

in the united

assistant

in the department

described

the department

Harper

made by Russian
understanding

states,

studied

refugees.

of world revolution.
Between
published

a professor

Poole's

tenure.

Harper

of the division

documents,

translated

and analyzed

reports

Their goal was to gain an
Bolshevik

principles,

the character
control,

of their rule,
and the program

".0
1919 and October

three detailed

"Ibid.,

and interpreting

served as a special

of Bolshevik

October

memoranda,

1920, the division

whose contents

were

p. 4.

7·samuel N. Harper,

The Russia

I Believe

In, p. 126.

"Ibid., p. 126. Poole said of Harper, "We all loved
him."
The Oral History Collection. Poole's Oral History,
Columbia University, New York. The Samuel Harper Papers,
University of Chicago, are also indispensable for their
insight into the thinking of the officers of the Russian
Division.
The collection has a large number of semiofficial and personal letters which were exchanged between
Harper and the staff members of the Russian Division.
80Il..,
bOd

p.

128.

an

and one of the few scholars

of the "fundamental

results

became

as "a kind of embassy-in-exile.""

and aims -- covering

the economic

but

Revolution.""

Division

collating

during

and the officers

newspapers,

methods,

tyranny

about Russia. ,,7. Samuel N. Harper,

of Russia

Russian

the Russian

for "collecting,

from the University

There,

has had political
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communicated

to the Congress

and the American

order that they might better understand
policy

of nonrecognition.

became

a blueprint

documents
ambition
between

were collected

the Bolsheviks,

communist

International

addition

to serving

memoranda

developed

Department's

recognize
obligingly

revolutionary
slaves"

illustrated."

nonrecognition

In

intent, the

policy.

Two years

increasingly

leaders

difficult

as simply a little

insurrectionists.

of time, the State Department

to justify

its persistent

the despised

regime.

such a rationale

communist

and the

for the State

unrepresentative

officially
provided

The linkage

was sharply

it had become

sought a new rationale

the soviet's

Soviets,

with the passage

studies

communist

the Russian

the Bolshevik

group of unstable,
Consequently,

world-wide.

a justification

after the Revolution,
to characterize

Actual

as an expose of Soviet

unyielding

academic

which demonstrated

to export communism

in

the leadership's

These original

for later reserach.

people,

propaganda

to

The Soviets

by grinding

exhorting

of the world to rise up against

refusal

out

the "wage

their capitalist

masters.
The communists'
appeal to the American

propaganda
masses

was carefully

-- the underpaid

skewed to
workers,

the

"Ibid., p. 128-129.
Also see Frederic Propas, "The
State Department, Bureaucratic Politics and Soviet-American
Relations 1918-1938," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California, Los Angeles, 1982), pp. 18-24.
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oppressed

Negroes

atheistic

rulers

message

-- and the utopian

of the new Russia wrapped

-- however

rhetoric,

unintentionally

it was uniformly

The American
graciously,

intellectuals.

with anger and contempt

their radical

in the united

pUblic was not disposed
and its business

a Christian

around

ignored

If the

states.

to accept criticism

and political

any disturbance

leaders

dismissed

of their collective

conscience.
And so the policy makers
and refused

to acknowledge

Government.

Secretary

personified

Hughes
serious,

was that Moscow

of the Soviet
Evans Hughes

We didn't

Hughes

trembling

laughed,

Harper

[Hughes] remarked
thought

and did not realize

of self-respect.

arrogance

once showed him a cartoon

which pictured

" ...then, turning

of its propaganda

Harper

propaganda.

one of the troubles

matter

of State Charles

newspaper

he studied Moscow
reported,

the existence

this attitude.

from a Moscow

rose in majestic

as

that

we were afraid

that it was simply a

like it, and we weren't

going to stand for it. ,,82
Hughes was not only architect
champion

of the nonrecognitionists.

Betty Glad, argues that Hughes'
realization
power."

that the United

As the "leading

was incumbent

"Samuel

Hughes'

position

creditor

nation

biographer,

was based on the

States had become

upon the United

N. Harper,

of the policy but

a "major

of the world"

it

States to establish

The Russia

I Believe

In, p. 130.
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"international
property

standards

rights."

repudiation
Government

for the protection

Thus, reasoned

of the debts

explicitly

for "membership

of property

demonstrated

Castle has characterized

machine

in the world,""
the respect

Division,

even the liberal

socialist,

Bullard was a cosmopolite,

traveled.

He has been characterized

Kennan,

as "a genuine

Russian

affairs,

Friends

of Russian

Freedom,

actively

supported

efforts

in czarist

Russia.

thirty-eight
was,in

Bullard

"Ibid.,
State.

and widely
critic,

Castle

in

of the American
liberals

to bring about political
man, Bullard
Revolution

"the best American

Evans Hughes

and

Long interested

a group of American

at the time of the Bolshevik

p. 98.

from

by the astute

A small, diffident

83Betty
Glad, Charles
Innocence, pp. 312-313.

yet he

a journalist

well-read

idealist.""

mental

Bullard.

Division

had been Secretary

the words of Kennan,

whom

of the Russian

By profession

novelist,

George

taskmaster,

Arthur

Bullard was Chief of the Russian
1921.

Hughes,

,,83

of all the officials

1920 to March

ineligible

as "the most perfect

was a demanding

commanded

of American

that they were

in the family of nations.

William

November

the soviets'

incurred by the Provisional

and the confiscation

citizens,

Hughes,

of private

liberty
was
and

mind

and the Illusions

served as assistant

who

of

Secretary

"George Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, p. 47. Also
see: Peter G. Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment,
1917-1933, pp. 31-33.

of

38

observing

on the spot the course of the Russian

Revolution."'"
advised

Despite

against

his socialist

recognizing

to be "cold-blooded

leanings,

the Bolsheviks.

in their disregard

Bullard

He jUdged them

for the truth"

and as

"undemocratic ... as the former Tsar.""

Although

did he favor even de facto recognition,

he, like Miles,

concluded

that some contact with the Bolshevik

at no time

Government

was desirable.
Bullard's
opinions

universally

officials.

respected

"Personally

opinion

a diplomat,"
Russian

were coolly

intellectual

to pursue

at home than in registering

Division

Bullard's

tenure

and his influence

as a

in molding

its decisions

as

as chief of the

was brief but his jUdgments

on firm scholarship

a career

I would rather be engaged

he said.'"

and his

by state Department

He had little ambition

diplomat.
pUblic

analyses

were grounded

should not be

overlooked.
While Bullard

has been described

Young, who was appointed
Division

Chief of the newly expanded

on July 3, 1923, is best described

As a young man, Young had served
following

as an idealist,

his education,

practiced

he had opted for a career as a foreign

88

i d .,
I b1

p. 49.

87

i d .,
I b1

p . 270.

"'Ibid., p. 28.

Russian

as a realist.

in the military,

had briefly

Evan

service

and,

law.

In 1905

officer,

and

39
at the time of his appointment

in 1923, Young was regarded

as one of the most knowledgeable
the Bolsheviks.M

concerning
diplomats

from Russia

Americans

After the withdrawal

in 1918, the capable

Young had been instructed

on matters
American

and experienced

to set up an observation

post

in

Riga, Latvia.

Here, between

1918 and 1922, Young supervised

the collecting

and analyzing

of information

of the Bolsheviks.oo

activities

Based upon this research,
the durability

of the Bolshevik

1920, he wrote the Secretary
certain

suggestions

emphasize

on the

regarding

Young accurately
government.

of State,

On July 23,

"In submitting

our policy ... I wish to

the fact that the Soviet Government ... is now

[far] stronger

than for months past and that there is no

sign either external

or internal

of force or movement

might eventually

bring about its overthrow.""

Young's

greatest

strengths

recruit

able men to serve in the Division,

instrumental
Henderson

predicted

was his ability

in the recruitment

to the Russian

·Propas,

which

One of

to recognize

and

and he was

of both Kelley

and Loy

Division.

see note 34, pp. 31-32.

OOIbid., p. 32. For information on the Riga observation
post, see Natalie Grant, "The Russian section.
A Window on
the Soviet Union," Diplomatic History, 2, (Winter), 1978;
Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace, pp. 19-20.
"FRUS,

2:1920, p. 652.
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The respect
illustrated
Estonia

accorded

Young by his colleagues

by a letter Earl Packer wrote

in 1922, following

Young's

is

from Reval,

departure

from the

Baltics:
The field work has been very interesting under Mr.
He is very, very sound
Young's very able direction.
on the Russian situation---a close, sane and careful
student."
The high esteem with which Young was regarded
Department

officials

of the Russian
1922,

Division

following

Affairs

geographic

by the united

had become

a full-fledged

politico-

with the designation

Affairs.

October

10, 1922, the Division

of matters

in addition
Young's

but the available
contributions

department

had assumed

to Russia,

supports

order of

and

Baltic

by historians,

the argument

Division

immeasurable

sUbsequently

of

Finland

career has been neglected

evidence

that his

and to the observation

and that the importance

achieved

of

general

to the three newly established

to the Russian

post in Riga were

"Division

Under a state Department

pertaining

10,

states of the new
the Division

European

republics.

On October

and Lithuania,

Eastern

Poland,

as Chief

Latvia,

division

supervision

by his appointment

after its expansion.

recognition

states of Estonia,
Russian

is revealed

by state

is directly

traceable

his able leadership.

9'Earl Packer to Samuel Harper, October
Harper Papers, University of Chicago.

22, 1922.

the
to

41
Several

other personalities

made up the early members
called.

Foremost

formed the group which

of "EE," as the division

among them was the gregarious

who was in Russia during

the Bolshevik

spent time in Riga and in the Russian
a man with a whimsical
while

nature.

Division.

an assistant

attache

and eventually

post.93

Like Kelley,

Russian

emigrees

While
another

Klieforth

as a military
to an American

While

military

to the displaced

Packer met Alfred

During

later married.

Unlike

sisters,

Packer,

a true Sovietologist,

contributions

to the department
Division

Klieforth,

1917, they roomed together

be considered

Klieforth

clerk.

last a lifetime.

owned by three Russian

base of the Russian

he impulsively

Packer I s commitment

in Petrograd,

an apartment

Packer was

ended up at the Riga observation

would

"EE" member.

and who

In 1917, at twenty-three,

to go to Petrograd

there, he became

Earl Packer,

Revolution,

serving with the War Department,

volunteered

was

during

one of whom

Klieforth

nevertheless

broadened

in

could not

his

the informational

its formative

years.

had served as a clerk in the American

Embassy

in Petrograd

officer

in Finland

in 1916 and as a passport

during

and after the War.

control
Between

1920

"Packer Interview; Also see: Foy D. Kohler and Mose L.
Harvey, editors, The Soviet union:
Yesterday. Today,
Tomorrow, A Colloquy of American Long Timers in Moscow,
Monographs in International Affairs (Coral Gables:
Center
for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami,
1975) pp. 157-163.
(Hereafter cited Long Timers)
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and 1924, he was assigned

to the Russian

was sent to the observation
During
analyzing

the "economic

measures,'

the alleged

implemented

within

that during

this period

"capitalistic

(NEP) was being
Lenin,

and tested,

the capitalism

we have authority

viewed

Policy

reluctantly.

had said, "It is

which we have permitted;

and bad, we can correct
in our hands,

it,

and therefore

we

of the Russian

this shift in policy with suspicion.

Klieforth

warily

strings"

attached.

Mpropas,

conceptions"oo

albeit

have no reason to fear. ,,97The officers
Division

property,"

The New Economic

of this shift in policy,

to permit

'new

then being

of "private

and "individualistic

initiated

for

It will be remembered

the concepts

if it proves unsatisfactory
because

concessions,"

of flux in Russia.

in defense

necessary

economic

was responsible

of all the recent

soviet Russia.~

methods"

were in a period

Klieforth

content

and later

at Riga.94

station

1921 and 1922,

Division

charged

"The

that the NEP had "communist

"I think ... the government

state Department ...·',p.

definitely

77.

~Harper to Klieforth, June 81,
Papers, University of Chicago.

[sic] 1921.

96Research Paper, "Reflections"
Harper to Klieforth, May 11, 1922.
University of Chicago.

attached to letter,
Harper Papers,

"Ibid.,

Harper

is directly

quoting

Lenin.

Harper

43

and with serious
Harper

forethought

attaches

strings,,,98he wrote

in May 1922.
A stern anti-communist,

with writers
commenting

who disagreed

also actively

involved

recognition,

beautifully. ,,'00
was assigned
Germany

in the recognition

After

reveals

leaving Washington

Europe,

hearings
a victory

was

of 1924.
for those

in 1924, Klieforth

He later served

in

but his personal

that his interest

in soviet Russia

tot

Loy Henderson
the Russian

associated

"Ross' book is

"The show went off

to Riga for two years.

never diminished.

staffed

which heralded

he wrote,

and throughout

correspondence

book, he wrote,

position.

in our Zoo of atrocities.,,99 Kleiforth

Pleased with the results,
opposing

had little patience

with the department's

on a contemporary

among the worst

Klieforth

was another
Division.

with events

of the early officers

who

His name is most often

following

recognition

of Russia,

when

9'Ibid. Kl ieforth, as requested by Harper had made
personal notes and comments in the margins of the research
paper.
99Klieforth to Harper, December 8, 1923, Harper Papers,
University of Chicago.
Harper in a letter to Klieforth
wrote, "What cheap stuff he [Ross] hands out. And what a
lot of misstatements or partisan statements."
Harper
Papers, University of Chicago.
'OOKl
ieforth to Harper,
University of Chicago.

February

4, 1924,

Harper

Papers,

'''JohnWiley to Klieforth, December 22, 1933, Wiley to
Klieforth, February 21, 1935, John Wiley Papers, General
Correspondence I-K, Box 7, Franklin Roosevelt Presidential
Library, Hyde Park.
(Hereafter cited, Wiley Papers.)
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he was assigned
unshakable

to the American

anti-communist

his early training
Affairs.
soviets

in Moscow,

but his

views were first formulated

in Riga and in the Department

He never wavered
nor in his feeling

socialist

Embassy

in either his distrust
of utter repugnance

during

of Russian
of the

for their

philosophy. 102

There were others,
associated

often faceless personalities,

with the Department

Felix Cole, Preston

Kumler,

during those early years

Orsen Nielsen.

Fragments

of

history,

their names fleetingly

appeared

on the official

records,

but now their stories

are lost.

Some of them

sought anonymity
Murphy

in their own time.

and an elusive

attempted

to explain

"Carter."

Two such men were Ray

Years later, Packer

their activities:

Carter studied communist activities in the united
states.
He had a room somewhere in the
department ... sub rosa, probably.
Ray Murphy?
Oh,
yes, he's another one.
I have a hard time defining
the scope of Ray's activities.
I suspect that Ray
Murphy and Carter succeeded one another--without
knowing the facts.
It's too remote. 103

10'Henderson to Wiley, December 19, 1939, Wiley Papers,
FDR Library.
Henderson wrote, "The feeling against the
Soviet union has reached a high pitch.
For the first time
in many years the American people are really commencing to
understand something about the Soviet Union."
Also see,
Long Timers, p. ix. Henderson's views are stated throughout
this colloquy.
103Packer Interview,

February

1989,

New York City.
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A former state Department
Kelley's

"gumshoe man."

propaganda

Russian

Division

common distrust
diplomat,

represented
Russia.

a permanent

In accordance

new government

betrayed

political

intentions

and

revolution

and social change

with these attitudes,

It is understandable,

the war

with the

that the Bolshevik

as representing

in their promotion

to social

the Bolshevik's

in

they saw the

an enemy who must be studied.

At no time did they contemplate
option.

the professional

and were in collusion

and Young realized

of the

they shared a

approach

the Bolsheviks

Bullard mistrusted

states.1O'

the first chiefs

Miles,

the Bolshevik's

as

files on soviet

backgrounds,

of the Bolsheviks.

effort and the Allies

Murphy

in the United

that although

Poole believed

Germans.

described

compiled

agents

had diverse

disliked

justice.105

methods,

Murphy

and subversion

It is significant

officer

recognition

as a viable

then, that they were united

of the United

states'

policy

of

nonrecognition.
In contrast
researcher

to the elusiveness

striving

to uncover

which plagues

and understand

the

the thinking

1O'ThomasF. Troy, "Ah, Sweet Intrigue!
Or, Who Axed
State's Prewar soviet Division?", Foreign Intelligence
Literary Scene, Vol. 3, No.5,
October 1984, p. 2, copy of
article, Kelley Papers, Georgetown University.
I~Basil Miles to Harper, April 22, 1920. Miles was
commenting on strikes in America as a viable method to readjust "social conditions which our Bolshevik friends are so
anxious to accomplish at once for mankind by force."
Harper
Papers, University of Chicago.
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and motivation
their policy
definite.

of the forgotten

recommendations

appear

They can be summarized

Recognition
refused

men of the Russian

was impossible

straightforward

property

2) refused

as long as soviet Russia

communist

This would continue
government

Americans

until

propaganda

whose

and 3) refused

into the united

to be the position

of the united

states.
states

1933.

The nonrecognition
following

to compensate

1)

by the Provisional

inside Russia had been confiscated,

to stop sending

and

as follows:

to settle the debts contracted

Government,

Division,

chapter.

policy will be analyzed

Suffice

in the

it to state at this point that

the policy was firmly in place by the time Kelley was
appointed

chief of the Division

in 1925, and that it would

be Kelley who would have to face the first serious
to that inflexible
united

policy.

Ironically

enough,

challenge

it was the

States courts which would compel that reevaluation.

CHAPTER

III

THE KELLEY APPROACH
On November
American

22, 1924, an unexpected

Legation

foundation
Division

at Riga, Latvia jarred the solid

upon which the officers

had erected

the recognition

the legitimacy
recognition
defiance

of its position

Alleged

in denying

to the soviet Government.

added to their dismay.

offending

of the previous

European

policy.
January

Not since
had the

been faced with a more lethal challenge

had originated

frustrated

of the Eastern

their nonrecognition

hearings

state Department

cable from the

indignation
cable read:

diplomatic

That this unexpected

in the united

states

The officers'

reactions

to outright
Judgment

to Imply Recognition

courts

apprehension.

of American

ranged

from

The

Supreme

of the Sovereignty

only

Court

of the

s .s .s .R. 106
The jUdgment
Wulfsohn

in question

et al., v. Russian

concerned

Socialist

to

the case of Max

Federated

Soviet

l06J.
C. White, Charge d'Affaires, American Legation,
Riga to State Department, "Report No. 606."
October 28,
1924, DSNA, Record Group 59, File 711.61/95.
Also see:
361.1153 W 95.
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Republic,

Appellant, \07a case which had been argued

New York Supreme
before

Court in 1922 and 1923.

The question

the Court had been "Can the defendant

which has not been recognized
united

states government

as a sovereign

[S.S.S.R.]
state by the

be sued in the courts of this state

[N.Y.] as a foreign corporation?,,'08 The majority
written

by Judge J. Andrews

justices

and supported

with only one dissenting,

Federated
government

soviet Republic

in the

opinion,

by five concurring

stated that "The Russian

is the existing

of Russia ...it is a matter

de facto

of common

knowledge. ,,'09
The cable from Riga concerned
a translation

of an article

this case and contained

from Izvestia"° which

read:

The jUdgment of the Supreme Court in the Wulfson
[sic] Case confirms the jUdgment of the New York
Court which rejected Wulfson's [sic] suit against
the Soviet government; this jUdgment of the Supreme
Court constitutes an authoritative precedent for all
courts in the United States, and it recognizes the
Soviet Federation as a sovereign State which in
virtue of this fact cannot, without its consent, be
proceeded against in American courts. "'

'07Wulfsohn v. Russian Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, pp. 372377, 138 N.E. 24 (1923). Also see: Alfred Hayes, "Private
Claims Against Foreign Sovereigns," Harvard Law Review, Vol.
38, 1924-1925, p. 620.
\08Wulfsohn v. Russian
109

Republic,

234 N.Y., p . 373.

b i.d
Il.,p.374.

110Izvestia was the official
No. 237, October 16, 1924.
"'DSNA, Record
606," p. 2.

soviet newspaper.

Group 59, File 711.61/95,

Article

"Report No.
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The article

went on to quote New York attorney

Recht, who had represented

Charles

the defendant:

Regardless of the political position taken by the
Department of state, the jUdgment of the Supreme
Court constitutes a definite and authoritative legal
recognition of the sovereignty of the Soviet
Federation, in that it accords to the S.S.S.R. the
same rights as are enjoyed by all other sovereign
foreign states which, in the view of American law,
cannot be proceeded against without their consent in
American courts of law. 112
In the past, State Department
skirted
entire

the historical
recognition

arguments

question

and had elected

economic,

considerations.

Now, the American

state Department

to reevaluate

Russian
Robert

the

to base their

and political
courts were forcing

this fixed,

the

inflexible

the legal issues would simply have to be

addressed.
analysis

had carefully

and legal issues surrounding

on emotional,

approach:

officials

Quite naturally,

the responsibility

fell on the shoulders
expert

in the Division

for this

of the newly-proclaimed
of Eastern

European

Affairs,

Kelley.
Kelley's

historically

response

to this compelling

significant

laid bare the ambiguities
politics

triumphed

Second,

it brought

role self-interest
an individual
112

• d
Lb i,
.,

for a number of reasons.
of a foreign policy

over law and emotion

was

First,

conquered

reason.

question

-- whether

a department,

of a nation,

in the formulation

it

in which

into focus the critical

-- played
p. 2 •

challenge

of what

of foreign

or
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policy.

Finally,

modus operandi

Kelley's

approach

with which he not only tackled

but would attack

future problems.

been for the facts of Kelley's
meaning

of that life.

importance
America's

of Kelley's
policy

analyzing

are widely

role in formulating

of nonrecognition.

To understand

are why and how.

agreed

on the

and sustaining
they

In this chapter,

those answers

nonrecognition

the seriousness

for the

The questions

113

as he faced the serious

the state Department's

this challenge

life but rather

will be made to provide
Kelley

of the

Here, the search has not

Historians

have not fUlly answered
an attempt

was demonstrative

by

legal challenge

to

policy.
of this challenge,

might be well to review the development

it

of that policy

which, by 1924, had been in place for seven years.
As has already
caught Washington
Department

by surprise.

was first stunned

inflammatory
Bolshevik

leadership.

.

emanating
feeling

Revolution
state
by the

from the

itself to be a good

states government

Secretary

this position

S ee fl'
or examp

113

and then outraged

Wounded,

the United

moral high ground.

.

The bewildered

social propositions

friend betrayed,

emphasized

been shown, the Bolshevik

retreated

of State Bainbridge

on August

to a

Colby

10, 1920, in a note to

e: Donald G. BlShop , The RooseveltLltvlnov A?reements, pp. 12, 17; Joan Hoff Wilson, Ideology
and Economlcs, pp. 38, 39 99 100; Williams Appleman
Williams, American Russia~ Relations 1781-1947, p. 209;
Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace, pp. 20-21.

51
the Italian Ambassador

at Washington,

Baron Camillo

Avezzana:
It is not possible for the government of the
united states to recognize the present rulers of
Russia as a government with which the relations
common to friendly governments can be maintained.
This conviction has nothing to do with any
particular political or social structure which the
Russian people themselves may see fit to embrace.
It rests upon a wholly different set of facts.
These facts, which none dispute, have convinced the
Government of the united states, against its will,
that the existing regime in Russia is based upon the
negation of every principle of honor and good faith,
and every usage and convention, underlying the whole
structure of international law; the negation, in
short, of every principle upon which it is possible
to base harmonious and trustful relations, whether
of nations or individuals .... In the view of this
Government, there cannot be any common ground upon
which it can stand with a power whose conceptions of
international relations are so entirely alien to its
.
own, so utterly repugnant to ltS
mora 1 sense. 11.
Colby's

emotional

official

support

argument

of nonrecognition

In spite of Colby's
Government,

would continue
until

castigation

it is worth mentioning

to be used
1933.

of the Soviet

that a month before

note was sent, on July 8, 1920, the Department
announced"

the "removal

in

of the restrictions

in the way of trade and communications

this

of State had

which had stood

with Soviet

'''FRUS,2:1920, Colby to Avezzana, August 10, 1920, pp.
463-468.
For a history of Colby's note see: Ronald Radosh,
"John Spargo and Wilson's Russian Policy, 1920, The Journal
of American History, Vol. 52, 1965, pp. 548-565.
Radosh
argues that John Spargo, who was closely associated with the
Russian Division of the State Department, wrote the first,
and nearly unchanged draft of the policy statement.
Spargo
was in close contact with John A. Gade, who was briefly and
at that time, chief of the Department of Russian Affairs.
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Russia.

The department,

,,115

with business
"individuals
opportunity

interests,

"although
policy

continued

or corporations

business

themselves

of the

spokesmen

The careful

,,11'

has convincingly
did sometimes

as irrelevant

that organized

argued

groundswell

government

of support

community.

with the communists

caused a dilemma

leaders because,

pressure

to U.s. standards

trading

with them remained

by this ethical

from the American
trading

for more thoughtful
refused

and politics,"

"ideologically
however,

trade with

out, however,

of economics

officials,

ambiguity

why there was no

as long as the soviets

conform

state Department

helps to explain

As Wilson points

the

or shortsighted,

business

for recognition

that

criticize

and in some cases even facilitating,

an unrecognized

unmoved

that

recognition.,,117 The state Department's

in allowing,

business

availing

Joan Hoff Wilson,

there is no evidence

business

to emphasize

and at their own risk.

of nonrecognition

prompted

cooperating

to trade with Russia would do so on their own

responsibility
historian,

while officially

unacceptable.

appeared

,,118

to remain

conflict.

"'Kelley to Secretary of State, October 29, 1926,
report attached, "The Policy of the united states towards
the Soviet Regime," p. 3. Kelley Papers, Georgetown
University, Washington, D.C.
"'Ibid., p , 3.
117JoanHoff Wilson,
118I

b i.i,d .,

p.

110.

Ideology

and Economics,

p. 112.

"to
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The adroit diplomat,
replaced

Colby as Secretary

sophisticated

economic

Committee

question

international

Hughes

rights are repudiated
Hughes

of Russia,

saved his most compelling

end of his remarks.
inflammatory

in Europe

as well as in America,

step, stubbornly

comrades,

and

for the

from a particularly
the previous

systematically,
of teeth

is coming
step by

in both camps.

cruel, and sanguinary! '" --

Hughes

softly concluded,

desire

is a world not threatened

propaganda

argument

that revolution

and with gnashing

It will be long protracted,

is it to speak

obligations

political

speech given by Leon Trotsky

"'That means,

is

is confiscated?"'"

He began by quoting

October.

" ...the

to discharge

"if valid

and property

On March

of a government

...Of what avail

demanded,

more

of the Women's

he said,

and a disposition

obligations .

of assurances,"

arguments.

in the recognition

it shows ability

who

of State in 1921, advanced

before the delegation

for Recognition

fundamental

Evans Hughes,

and political

21, 1923, in an address

whether

Charles

"We want to help ...but the world we
with the destructive

of the Soviet authorities,

will be good faith and the recognition

and one in which there
of obligations

and a

119FRUS,
2:1923, March 21, 1923, pp. 756-757.
For a
Russian historical perspective on these policies see:
Nikolai v. Sivachev and Nikolia N. Yakovlev, tr. Olga Alder
Titelbaum, Russia and the united States, pp. 75-118.
Hughes
was characterized on September 26, 1924, by Soviet Commissar
Chicherin, as a man, "who express(es) the will of the big
bankers and trusts of America."
Ibid., p. 80.
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sound basis of international
was reprinted

and copies were distributed

state Department's
subtle

intercourse.

position.

shift in policy,

on Soviet propaganda

This speech

,,120

to support

the

The speech also marked

in that greater

as a reason

emphasis

for denying

a

was placed

recognition

to

the Communists.
In July
enunciate

1923,

Hughes

his views and to further

Department's

anti-communist

reply to Samuel Gompers,
wrote

again had an opportunity

in defense

solidify

stance.

President

the state

In a widely

quoted

of the A.F.L.,

of the Department's

position:

is that there is conclusive

control

in Moscow have not given up their original

throughout
deemed

ultimate

wherever

that those

they can do so

of our people

to the acceptance

and definite

firm statements

states.

"was largely

occupied

the Eastern

in supporting

120FRUS, 2:1923,

March 21,1923,

12'FRUS, 2:1923,

July 9,

1923,

as an

of the free

built up .... ,,12'

won broad public

Meanwhile,

is not

into political

aim, the destruction

which we have laboriously

in

purpose

of this regime so long as it ...cherishes,

insti tutions
Hughes's

governments

the world .... the sentiment

to be favorable

fellowship

United

existing

evidence

Hughes

"What is most

serious

of destroying

to

support

European

within

division

the nonrecognition

p , 758.
pp. 763-764.

the
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policy

of Mr. Hughes.

resented

This hostile

,,122

by the Soviets,

and Russian

the period

as a time when America

assumption

that in the postwar

As indicated
the Soviet
somewhat

overture

moderate

which

"proceeded

from the

political,

President

to Congress

coolidge's

in December

bitter defeat

Eastern

Europeanists

during the recognition

further

served to secure the State Department's

allowing

position.

were

ignored;

in a policy which denied
government

an entire State Department
prevent

recognition

recognition

had

hostile,
in

was denied,

if there were contradictions
to a

for seven years,

those

and if there was paradox

division

devising

rather than assisting

a stratagem

in
to

to bring

about, then the acknowledgement

was suppressed.

hearings

de facto recognition

were disregarded;

The

at the hands of the

whose existence

which had been in place

contradictions

1923.

And if there were ambiguities

trade with a government

those ambiguities

while only

I, Hughes had cooly rebuffed

pro-recognitionists'

immoveable

and

,,123

followed

address

have viewed

could make demands

to respond.

in Chapter

historians

economic,

moral world only the Americans
others were obligated

stance was bitterly

But now the legal question

of that paradox
demanded

an

122John C. White,
official in Eastern European Division,
Oral History Collection, Columbia University, p. 69, cited
in Nikolai v. Sivachev and Nikolia N. Yakovlev, Russia and
the united States, p. 80, footnote No. 15, p. 278.

b' d

12311..,

p . 82.
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answer.

It was impossible

An analysis

of that demand

to ignore, disregard
and the method

arrived

at an answer presents

examine

what

in this paper

Kelley's

approach

to problem

solving

By birth he was ill-equipped

aristocratic

world of twentieth

wealthy,

cultured

other hand, was Catholic,

a modest

cottage.

business

tycoons,

by Anglophiles

college

on the

and poor.

and military
hard-working

They
in

scholarships;

commanders;
janitor

at

They spent their youth at private
abroad;

Kelley

Their fathers donated

Nor was wealth
exposure

Kelley,

Kelley had been raised

large landowners

or studying

schools.

diplomacy,

They were the sons of professionals,

the local high school.

pUblic

in the

who were

Irish, unpolished

Kelley was the son of a respected

prep schools

to compete

and suave.

II

owed much to his

century American

had been born in family mansions;

to

liThe Kelley Approach.

background.

Protestant,

by which Kelley

an ideal opportunity

is called

which tended to be dominated

or suppress.

spent his attending
money to create

Kelly was awarded

one. 124

the only determinant.

to high culture

-- leather-bound

Years of
books and European

124The
material for this biographical sketch has been
gathered from many sources.
Most helpful were Kelley's
papers, Georgetown university, Washington, D.C. and the
memoirs of his contemporaries
(listed in bibliography).
Samples of his personal correspondence are available in The
John Wiley Papers, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York; The
Samuel Harper Papers, University of Chicago, Illinois; and
the Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
For a discussion of the aristocratic attitudes of early
twentieth diplomats see: Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club;
Robert D. Schulzinger, The Making of the Diplomatic Mind.
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music,

imported

and serious

china and hand-cut

conversation

crystal,

-- had provided

embodied

If indeed America

snob-riddled

company,

the perfect

antithesis

Kelley unlike
families,
behavior
neither

century

of the diplomatic
nonconformist.
poker player.

other diplomats

from middle

aristocratic

nor the manners

Although

mode.

grace, preferring

described

eyes of an outsider
A society

him, rather unkindly,

plump, pleasant,

subtle,

Even in a starched
unbuttoned,

patricians

to smash

a smooth volley.

His hair was thinning,

of a scholar.

He adopted

-- a sport of

he had a wide face dominated

He had the watchful

his

fan and an expert

the ball across the net rather than return

countenance

to remodel

a plebeian

he played tennis

-- he did so without

class

of the refined

He was a noisy baseball

and a high forehead.

In that

of the ideal diplomat.

corps but remained

Physically,

it was

In short, he was

either made no effort or was unable

the tastes

of

men from

diplomats.

Kelley was a misfit.

after the prevailing

gentlemen

ordinary

had an aristocracy,

in her early twentieth

repartee

these offspring

the elite with the patina which separates
gentlemen.

clever

by a big nose

his neck thick.

and the thoughtful

columnist

as "not overly

once
chatty,

(though he doesn I t look it). ,,125

white shirt he appeared

his tie awry, his trousers

rumpled,

wrinkled.

his coat

He had the

125Helen
Essary, Town and Country, February 1936, Kelley
Papers, Scrapbook, Georgetown University, washington, D.C.
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damp look of a man plagued
problem.

Above all, Kelley

prerequisite
element

perspiration

lacked that near essential

of all diplomats

-- the intangible,

elusive

of style.

Yet Kelley
balanced
a great

endured.

His intellectual

his other deficiencies,
intellect.

stubborn,

insecurity

with arrogance,

he had replaced
intellectual

sensitivity

of diplomatic

to the opportunities

society.

Understandably,

had to be viewed

laudable

when examining

the soviet Government.

It was

eloquent

in the achiever

system was the best in the

almost as a personal

be considered

cast an anathema,

fiercely

and

in a democratic

any repudiation

and his personal,

have pulled

to cloak

power in America.

it also inculcated

For such a person,

the world-wide

machine.

earned him a position

inherent

the belief that the democratic

towards

he had

with abruptness,

and one which rendered

testimony

therefore

mental

he had learned

veneer which eventually

no small achievement

upbringing

easily

his lack of social patina with a hard

close to the center

world.

intelligence,

gift into a formidable

and pragmatic,

prowess

for Kelley was indisputably

Born with innate

honed that natural
Proud,

by a perpetual

of that system

affront.

Kelley's

achievements

must

his acrimonious

The communist

views

philosophy

after all, on his own accomplishments,

triumph

of that philosophy

and

might very well

him down from the tall, steep ladder he had so

and so painfully

climbed.
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The path of Kelley's
childhood.

climb was foreshadowed

from

"Robert never had to be urged to study,"

father recalled.

"His home lessons while

in grammar

his
and

high schools

here and at Harvard

His research

skills had been refined while an undergraduate.

"On being given a sUbject,"
to do is to ascertain

Kelley wrote,

the sUbject

event. ,,127A flaw which would
analyses
comment

were his first concern. ,,126

scope and date of the

later surface

for the state Department

evidence

at in the

"You might do more with

herJ ...military

history. ,,128During his diplomatic
ignored pertinent

in Kelley's

is hinted

of one of his professors.

Italy ... [by also considering

"the first thing

career,

and concentrated

and diplomatic

Kelley

frequently

on those

facts

and events which tended to sustain his own preconceived
conclusions.

During his college

days, Kelley

signs of being able to bend ethical
recopied,

in his own handwriting

alterations,

concepts.

already

showed

He once

and with only minimal

one of his own "A" papers

for submission

by a

126GeorgeAbala, Interview with Mr. & Mrs. James H.
Kelley, Washington Daily News, January 20, 1931, Kelley
Papers, Scrapbook, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
127RobertKelley, "Sources to be used in the Compilation
of a Bibliography of the Crimean War," History 25, Kelley
Papers, Folder 1, Box 1, Georgetown University, Washington,
D.C.
128Ibid.
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fellow student.

'29

would

in 1927, when Kelley recommended

policy

reemerge

decisions

committed

This same disregard

for established

made by the state Department

to writing

but rather delivered

the time Kelley graduated
style of thought

from Harvard,

and writing

rules

that foreign

not be

verbally.'~

By

he had developed

a

which would be his personal

mark for the rest of his life.
Kelley had an organized
wordsmith

nor a phrasemaker,

distinguished
adjectives

and logical mind.
his official

by sleek, cold prose.

and scowled

his personal

at adverbs.

correspondence,

Neither

writings

He frowned

were

at

This was in contrast

which was remarkable

He was fond of simple metaphorical

play.

on Coolidge's

Samual Harper
the wheel,

in March,

or rather

of state continues
continue."'~
John wiley,

presidency,

word

Kelley wrote

1925, "The new pilot has now taken

is directing

the helmsman,

its course as charted

he wrote concerning
activities

Wiley's

in Germany,

and the ship

out and will

In a letter to his close friend,

the Bolsheviks'

to

for its

warm earthiness.
Commenting

a

the diplomat

numerous

reports

on

"I hope that you will

129Robert
Kelley, "Roman occupation of Spain," History
3.B., compare with, "The Romanization of Spain," Folder 1,
Box 1, Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington,
D.C.

13°Robert Kelley, Memorandum,
October 28, 1927, DSNA,
Record Group 59, File 861.51 AM 3; quoted in Joan Hoff
Wilson, Ideaology and Economics, p. 40.

'~Kelley to Harper, March la, 1925, Harper
University of Chicago, Illinois.

Papers,
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not conclude

that you have been feeding us too well,

you know, we are very

fond of rich food. ,,'" Kelley

commented

on a political

quizzical

phrase,

to provide

situation

for as

often

and ended with the

"What say yoU?,,'33 But as Kelley prepared

an answer to the legal questions

raised by the American

courts,

the warmth

which had been

disappeared

and

his cold and logical mind dominated.
Although
undoubtedly

A letter in the Eastern

the legal and historical

states government
independence
1.

had accepted

Thomas Jefferson

European

developed

as follows:

recognition

act depending

recognizing

state but conditioned

of

to be an

not upon the whim of the
solely by the

of the new organization ..."

"This de facto theory of recognition
by a long course

which the united

the de facto principle

"He conceived

stability

file clearly

from the time of American

independent

governmental

in law, he was

of de facto

theories

and could be summarized

recognition.

2.

lacked formal training

aware of the legal tenets

recognition.
outlined

Kelley

of precedents

had been followed

in the united

states

state Department."
3.

"This doctrine
practice

had subsequently

become

the general

in Europe."

'''Kelleyto Wiley, January
Library, Hyde Park, New York.

30, 1930, Wiley papers,

'33Kelley/Harper Correspondence 1925-1940,
Papers, University of Chicago, Illinois.

Harper

FDR
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4.

"The real basis upon which any recognition

is granted

is the existence

whether

of a de facto government,

not it is founded upon any juristic
If these arguments

had been accepted,

the soviet government
other decision
a law Americans

anomalous

it would appear

would have been inconsistent

The American
Department

basis."'"

should have been recognized,

proudly

to openly reevaluate

17, 1924, entitled

with the law

the state

the inconsistencies

"The Case for the Recognition

of its

of the

The paper was eleven typed pages long

without

corrections

or notations.

clearly

established

by the heavy, unmistakable

"R.F.K."l35 stripped

evidence.

for any

Kelley did so in a paper dated December

soviet Government."

concentrated

that

traced back to Thomas Jefferson.

courts now were forcing

position.

or

Its authorship

bare of emotion,

paragraph

initials

the arguments

only on the legal, political

The opening

was

contained

and economic
both a political

and a legal argument:
The recent celebration of the seventh anniversary of
the establishment of the soviet regime and the fact that
during the past year full recognition has been accorded
to the soviet government by nine European states,
including some of the most important, (thereby bringing
134Frederic R. Kellogg to F. M. Dearing, Assistant
Secretary of State, May 20, 1921.
DSNA, Record Group 59,
File 311.6154 C94/3., marked:
"Ack. by DW Poole, 6/2/21."
Kellogg was an attorney associated with the New York law
firm of Kellogg, Emery and Cuthell.
135RobertKelley, "The Case for the Recognition of the
Soviet Government," December 17, 1924, Kelley Papers,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

63

the total of European states that have granted
recognition to sixteen out of twenty-five), would seem
to have cleared the way for the recognition of the
Soviet government by the united States.
...It can
hardly be denied that the Soviet government has
succeeded in maintaining itself against all adverse
claimants and that it is in possession of the machinery
of state and administering government without
substantial resistance to its authority.
Neither can it
be gainsaid that it is in a position to fulfill all the
international obligations and responsibilities
incumbent
upon a foreign state under treaties and international
law. Such being the case, it would appear that, in view
of the significance of the act of recognition in
international practice, the Soviet government deserves,
in fact, recognition by this government. 136
Kelley
recognition

expanded

the legal argument

did not affirm approval

but merely

admitted,

is capable

of entering

power

into international

"stability"
qualities

international
attended

practice,"

with unwelcome

consequences.

and not with

Any "deviations
he wrote,

with the
"its

from this sound

"have generally

complications

been

and disagreeable

n 137

were then examined.

ramifications

"The difficulties,"

Ibid.,

pp , 1-2.

Ibid.,

pp. 2-3.

137

but its effective

had only been concerned

The legal and economic

136

In

He argued that in the past the

of a foreign government

or methods."

exists and

obligations.

which makes it legitimate,

States government

really

"it is not the constitutionality

-- its stability ..."

United

that

of a form of government

"that this government

the long run, he reasoned,
of a government

by explaining

of nonrecognition
Kelley wrote,

64

" ...wherein
political

the de facto conditions

authorities,

the judicial

are ignored by the

are made manifest

authorities.

,,138

The courts,

been forced

"to accord to an unrecognized

government,

...the attributes

in the decisions
Kelley

of Kelley's

Wulfsohn

case, Luther v. Sagor and Company,

National

City Bank.

The wulfsohn
the plaintiff
alleged

case concerned

[Wulfsohn]

to have been confiscated

The New York Supreme
the unrecognized

against

13'Ibid., p. 5.
140

Ibid. , p. 5.

v.

of furs which
and which were

"had accorded

to

the rights of a

without

court.

,,140

its consent
Judge Andrews

be proceeded
had written:

[Our courts] may not bring a foreign sovereign
before our bar ...because he has not submitted
himself to our laws. without his consent he is not
subject to them.
Such is not the proper method of
redress if a citizen of the united states is
wronged.
The question is a political one, not
confided to the courts but to another department of
government.
Whenever an act done by a sovereign in

13'Ibid.r p. 5.

the

de jure in that it held that the

cannot,

in an American

argument:

by the soviet government.

soviet government,

soviet government

in Russia

Court, Kelley wrote,

government ...recognized

government. ,,13'

and Sokolov

the seizure

had stored

had

de facto

of a recognized

Three cases were cited in support

argued,

of
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his sovereign character is questioned
matter of negotiation or of reprisals

it becomes a
or of war.'"

The case of Luther v. Sagor and Company
argued

in November

and December

his second example.
injurious

effect,

commercial

on private

",.2

1920, was cited by Kelley

He cited this case to illustrate

transactions

nonrecognition.

[which resulted

It is somewhat

The case is a lengthy

confiscation
questions

of a private

of international

the Russian
Confiscatory

in Russia

Recognition

by His Majesty's

this country will not recognize
its sovereignty. ,,'43

legitimate

claims

Bench in

on

the statues

of sovereignty

of

and

the

or its sovereignty

Government

the courts

such foreign government

left business

against

cited

and touches

The point Kelley was making,

was, that this ruling

of

the

On the point of recognition,

court held, "that if a foreign government
is not recognized

the King's

law, jurisdiction,

Soviet Republic,
degrees.

that Kelley

one which concerns

sawmill

of

from] the policy

strange

as

"the

rights and on the security

this case at all as it was argued before
England.

which was

interests

of
or

of course,

which had

the Soviet government

without

redress.
'41Wulfsohn v. Russian
pp. 372-373.

Republic,

January

1923, 234 N. Y. ,

'''RobertKelley, "The Case for the Recognition of the
Soviet Government," December 17, 1924, p. 5, Kelley Papers,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
'''A.M. Luther v. James Sagor and Company, November 29,
1920 - December 8, 1921, Common Law Reports, K. B. 1921, pp.
456, 474. Cited quote can be found on page 456.
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The third example
Sokolov

v. National

out the necessity
created
actual

City Bank.

of passing

by a policy
situation

a majority
decision

was the case of

He wrote,

beyond

"The jUdge pointed

the legal fiction

of non recognition

and establishing

in Russia. ,,144This case concerned

made by the plaintiff,
of The National

Kelley mentioned

Sokoloff,

opinion

Branch

Judge J. Cardozo

found for the defendant,

Judge Cardozo

deposits

into the Petrograd

city Bank of New York.

the

Sokolov.

in

In his

wrote:

Juridically, a government that is unrecognized may
be viewed as no government at all, if the power
withholding recognition chooses thus to view it. In
practice, however, since juridical conceptions are
seldom, if ever carried to the limit of their logic,
the equivalence is not absolute, but is subject to
self-imposed limitations of common sense and
fairness ...foreign governments which, though
formally unrecognized have notoriously an existence
as governments de facto. 145
The implications
attention.
government
Historically
decision

are worth

The courts had been forced to view the Soviet
as the de facto government
the united

to recognize

conditions

of these jUdgments

of Russia.

States government

a new government

had based

its

upon "de facto

and not upon any de jure or legitimacy

theory. ,,146

144RobertKelley, "The Case for the Recognition of the
Soviet Government," December 17, 1924, p. 5, Kelley Papers,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
145Sokoloff v. National
Y. 158, 158-171, p. 165.

Group

City Bank, November

1924, 239 N.

14'Kellogg to Dearing, May 20, 1921, p. 3.
59, File 311.6154 C94/3.

DSNA, Record
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The logical

conclusion

was that the united

recognized

soviet Russia,

government

had.

As Kelley pointed

In a particularly
of Harvard

or at least that one branch

out, America's

was also often adversely

affected

cutting

Law Review,

states had

comment

Alfred

international

of

trade

by these legal decisions.
in the November

1924 issue

Hayes wrote:

It is amazing that at a time when there is a
persistent effort to have pUblic international
controversies determined jUdicially, the pecuniary
claims of private litigants are left to the
expensive, dilatory, and inefficient action of
diplomatic officers.
The courts have the necessary
machinery for securing and sifting evidence and
disposing of such claims on their merits.
In the
field of diplomacy the merits become involved with
political considerations. '"
Kelley was aware of these implications.
"rising out of the necessity
face realities,"
created

through

he wrote,

of the jUdicial

authorities

"reveal the confused

the misapprehension

the act of recognition

These decisions,

situation

of the real nature

in international

to

of

law."'·

'''AldredHayes , "Private Claims Against Foreign
Sovereigns," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 38, 1924-1925,

p. 621.

'·Robert Kelley, "The Case for the Recognition of the
Soviet Government," December 17, 1924, pp. 5-6, Kelley
Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D. C. For
related cases also see: Russian Socialist Federated Soviet
Republic v. Cibraio, 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259 (1923);
James and Company v. The Second Russian Insurance Company,
208 App. Div. 141, 205 N. Y. Supp. 472 (1924). While
neither of these cases are cited in Kelley's paper, they
also concerned the legal problems inherent in the
nonrecognition policy.
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Kelley then presented
called the absence
business

the economic

of recognition

interests.

argument.

"a stumbling

"As long as normal

He

block"

relations

to

do not

exist, trade will tend to fall into the hands of speculators
and non reputable
Finally,
between

business

states

the Bolsheviks

and Russia

governments,"

construction

arguments:

would

which would be beneficial

Finally,

concluded:

in the sphere

of foreign

"permit

of information"
Kelley

of the

handicapped

by the hostility

and recognition

disputes

could "best be

would be "deprived

argument ...that they are severely
of economic

,,149

he listed the political

the united

settled,"

concerns.

freer exchange

to both sides. ,,'50

It must not be forgotten that recognition will
tend to encourage the people of Russia to
realize that the responsibility for future
development in Russia rests upon them alone and
that foreign states have definitely abandoned
any intention of imposing their will upon
them. 15'
This curious
Kelley

document,

which was clearly

-- a man who personally

the soviet government
was it written,
importantly,

authored

did not favor recognition

-- raises a number of questions.

by whom was it ordered,

why were the forceful

by
of
Why

and most

arguments

outlined

in the

'49Robert Kelley,
"The Case for the Recognition of the
Soviet Government," December 17, 1924, p. 6., Kelley Papers,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

'50Ib id., p. 7.
15'Ibid.,p. 11.
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document,

rejected?

supporting

In the absence

evidence,

the legal arguments
courts

it can most likely be concluded
raised by the position

forced a reevaluation

policy.

Kelley's

support

emphasis

this thesis.

of a change

of indisputable

152

of America's

of the state Department's
on those arguments

in policy during the latter months

of Secretary

was staunchly
driven

question
difficult
question

of state Hughes,

anti-Bolshevik,

to response

by outside

that the United

states could maintain

not recognizing

the Soviet government.

recognition

was

is more

it remains

A simplified
greater

could be supplied

or nonrecognition:

at

The broader

were rejected

yet for historians,

of course,

was written

who like Kelley

pressures.

in the center of the storm.

Leverage

of 1924.'~

but who in this instance,

of why these arguments
to answer,

tends to

There had also been some discussion

There seems little doubt that the document
the request

that

the key
answer

leverage

is

by

by either

it was a choice between

the

152For a different
analysis see:
Frederic Propas, liThe
State Department, Bureaucratic Politics and Soviet-American
Relations 1918-1938,"
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California, Los Angeles, 1982), p. 36. Propas writes,
" ...Kelley's memo was an exercise setting forth the case for
the other side and anticipating rising opposition to the
policy of nonrecognition. II This is speculation which is
unsupported by the content of the paper.
Moreover, this
reason is highly unlikely judged by Kelley's consistent
approach to problem solving.
Propas' hesitancy is evident
from his later comment.
" ...it is worthwhile to examine
other explanations of this memo."
Ibid., p. 36.

''''WilliamsAppleman Williams,
Relations 1781 1947, p. 207.

American

Russian
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carrot or the stick, but nonrecognition
advantage

of always being reversible.

soviet government
remains

had the added

a matter

did not test it.

of speculation

policy.

to follow Europe's

officials

propaganda

revolution.

the United

The leadership

or to forget old betrayals.

state Department
communist

because

feared that the

the seeds of potential

remained

the "policy of choice" was an economic

world

in explaining

the American

desire

the leaders

states had become the greatest
and that commercial
pattern

outside markets
international

standard

The expanding

Russian

the primary

factor.

which would guarantee
disruption
intolerable
depended

intercourse

realized

creditor

that the

nation

in the

was a necessity

if the

Not only were

but there must be one single

to settle debts and arrange
market,

however

attractive,

credit.
was not

What was needed was a set of rules
global

economic

of trade and repudiation
to American

on expanding

one.

for the adoption

of life was to continue.

necessary,

the

the reason nonrecognition

public's

of isolationism,

capitalistic

world

the single element which carried

weight

united

was

lead and recognize

greatest

of a policy

a part

There were some

who sincerely

carried

However,

Despite

states

Both pride and fear may have played

disinclined

the soviets

or not the

could have been won over by friendship

in the state Department's
arrogantly

Whether

statesmen.

trade.

conformity.

The

of debts were simply
America's

The communist

prosperity

anti-
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capitalistic
America's

philosophy

and their unwillingness

rules was a disturbing

continuation

of American's

It is evident
state Department
rightness

influence

evaluation

the Soviet government.

nature,

concerns

of his strength

for never

the communists
Eastern

menace

is

of mind and his pragmatic

Division,

researchers,

Furthermore,

made up of hand picked

was dedicated

with
the

anti-

to uncovering

the

and any shift in policy might well have

that department.

Once again, the anti-recognitionists
this time by simply burying
In the future the propaganda
used to fuel the popular
the preferred

policy

As for Kelley,
named the youngest

had triumphed,

the legal and historical

fear of the Soviets

and thus keep

in place.
in 1925 at age thirty-one,

chief ever of a geographical
From that position

to chart the direction

of Russian-American

as important,

issues.

issue would be the rationale

the State Department.

Equally

legal and

in his long career was he comfortable

of communism

terminated

economic,

the document

or the Soviet government.

European

communist

For Kelley,

Obviously,

Emotional,

won the battle with

considerations.

illustrative

that he and the

were aware of the legal and historical

they chose to ignore these arguments.

rational

on the

affluence.

from Kelley's

of recognizing

and political

to accept

he would be
division

of

he would be able
relations.

he would be able to establish

a
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program

to train America's

younger

generation

childless

future sovietologists

of Russian

Kelley affectionately

whom he willed

experts

the soviet government.

-- whom the unmarried,

called,

his legacy of distrust

-- a

"my boys" and to

of communism

and of

CHAPTER
THE KELLEY

IV
LEGACY

At the time of the Bolshevik
little debate

among state Department

probable

durability

expected

it to fail.

the Russian
political
Policy

of the communist
This jUdgment,

civil War further

leaders

and continued

(NEP) which

redirected

political

entrenchment

as a swing towards
America's

political

language

or history

radical

of Russia

even after

the New Economic
Russia's

interpreted

and the economic

Holding

elite deemed

They

the communist

officials

capitalism.

concept

persisted

following

as temporary

on the

experiment.

and stabilized

Most state Department

there was

officials

entrenched

economy.

whose

Revolution

to Western

it irrelevant

or to understand

civilization

heritage

and traditions

reforms

these views,
to study the
Bolshevism,

of world order they detested

inimical

the

and an affront

which they proudly

as

to America's

traced back to

the Greeks.
Robert

Kelley deduced

events.

He believed

present

and possibly

America's

cherished

American-Russian

a different

that the communist
permanent
ideals.

relations,

meaning
ideology

from these
posed a

threat to democracy

Recognizing

and to

the importance

of

he urged the state Department

to
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allow him to initiate
service

officers

convinced

in Russian

to instruct

language

young

foreign

and history.

"I was

of the need for a group of officials

Department
Kelley

a program

of state who understood

in the

and spoke Russian,"

recalled:
I had the feeling that to learn the language is
not sUfficient, because language was an
expression of the people of the country.
So if
you really wanted to know the language you had
to know about the country.
And that meant
knowing thoroughly the history of Russia,
including the background of the Bolsheviks.'~

Supported

by Secretary

was accepted,
America's

of State Hughes,

funds were allocated,

future Soviet

experts

The young students,

studied

foreign

by Kelley
service

The views the bUdding

from the

officers,

direction

diplomats

their formative

days had a far-reaching

American-Soviet

relations,

for following

and

absorbed

effect

during

on future

recognition

1933, many of these young men staffed America's
Moscow

of

began.

for four years under Kelley's

tutelage.

proposal

and the training

hand-picked

ranks of the newly-accepted

Kelley's

and two of them later served as America's

in

embassy

in

ambassadors

to Russia.
Whether
development

of a more harmonious

two countries

Robert

154

164.

these views had a negative

is the sUbject

Kelley,

recorded

influence

relationship

between

of some controversy

at Colloquy,

on the
the

among

Long Timers,

p.
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historians.

There

of the importance
training

is, however,
of Kelley's

of America's

understood

however

-- however

well-educated

program

actually

or communist

the future diplomats

Years before,

Past.

the language

of Old Russia.

believe

students

encouraged

Present,

but

became

predicable,

aristocrats.

and
and

the

They, too, came to

philosophy

threatened

of their native American

violated

as

result.

the history,

As Kelley had hoped,

their spiritual

This chapter will examine

program

Kelley

That the students

by the literature,

that the communist

specialization

the study of

came to think and feel like pre-

Russian

the destruction
already

Instead,

will show

Kelley too had been lured into emotional
captivity

revolutionary

The evidence

as Kelley was a natural,

intellectual

American

less

young men into a

not to hate the Russian

rather to value Russia's
anti-communist

A point

-- was able to

discouraged

ideology.

in the

strong his personal

group of anti-communists.

that Kelley's
sovietism

role and influence

stern his discipline

fashion these bright,
dedicated

on the question

future Sovietologists.

is how Kelley

convictions,

no argument

program

on America's

Kelley's

future Russian

Russian
the effect

experts.

of that

In addition,

Kelley had, not only on his

"boys," but on all the foreign
time, by his participation

home but had

home, Old Russia.

and will analyze

it will show the influence

not only

service

trainees

in the Foreign

at that

Service

School.
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Finally,

it will discuss

the possible

ramifications

of that

influence.
After gaining

approval

European

language

searched

for schools

academic

training

few universities

and funding

for the Eastern

and area specialization
which could provide

he envisioned.
in the united

program,

the type of

At that time there were

states which offered

courses

in Russian

studies

Russian

scholars.

Samuel Harper was teaching

University
Hopper,

of Chicago;

and Malbone
University
isolated

Graham

these professors

at the
were

they offered

in Europe.

were

Kelley

universities.

Studies

with

-- the best known at the

of London under the direction
Kelley

Bruce

instructors

had several universities

of Slavonic

at the

was at Columbia;

and the programs

as those available

Great Britain

University

However,

is

ruled out American

departments

Kerner were

any

of American

former teacher,

A.C. Coolidge

and Robert

from one another

therefore

te

Kelley's

of California.

not as advanced

Pares.

and only a handful

was still at Harvard;

Kelley

felt Pares underestimated

of Sir Bernard
the dangers

'''Frederic Propas, "The State Department, Bureaucratic
Politics and Soviet-American Relations 1918-1928," (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1982),
p. 108; for information on Harper's classes, see:
Samuel
Harper, The Russia I Believe In, pp. 52, 136-137, 156.
'''Forbiographical information on Pares, see Ibid., pp.
37-38.
Also see: Harper-Pares Correspondence,
1906-1942,
Harper's Papers, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.; Names
of instructors and courses offered at the University of
London can be found listed in Slavonic Review, 1926-1927.
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inherent

in the communist

ideology

the Bolsheviks.

For this reason,

expose America's

future Russian

and was an apologist

for

Kelley was disinclined

to

experts

to Pares'

instruction.'"
Several
in December
stationed
Russian

other programs

in Prague,

were numerous
established

Berlin,

programs

institutes

by Russian

had been exiled
with a certain
Kelley

Kelley asked American

1927,

academic

were available

offered

in those cities.

Many of these

and viewed

about exposing
emigrees.

dangerous

doubtful

that most of the candidates

from the programs.

chosen,

probably

language

because

-- ambivalence.'5'

Furthermore,

languages

Nor were Germany's

of the students'

to

universities

lack of German

proficiency. 159

15'Frederic Propas, "The State Department,
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of California,
1982),

it was

would have been

in the Czech or Russian

benefit

experiment

his impressionable

to the Russian

enough

There

instructors

the communist

students

proficient

officers

in Prague which had been

-- and to Kelley,

felt uneasy

consular

and

and Paris to report on the

emigrees.

in 1921

in Europe,

. ,"
Los Angeles,

p , 109.

15'Ibid.,p , 106.
Harper claimed that there was a
"difference in psychology between the [Russian] emigrant
[1918] and the exile [1921]."
Also see:
Samuel Harper,
Russia I Believe In, p. 155.

The

159Frederic Propas, "The state Department,
. r (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1982) ,
p.

107.
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Kelley eventually
Vivante

selected

the Langue orientale

in Paris, which was under the direction

Boyer. 160 This choice was not surprising
both Kelley
Boyer.

ideological

the final decision

than academic

recalled,

"I was fortunate

orientale

Vivante,

assistance
in mind.

given the fact that

and his friend Samuel Harper

Undoubtedly

of Paul

had studied

under

was based more on

considerations,

for as Kelley

in Paris; the head of the Langue

Boyer, sympathized

with us and promised

and went out of his way to accomplish

what I had

161
11

with the location
determine

the structure

the students

decided,

of the four-year

were assigned

to an American

embassy

the next step was to
program.

for approximately

or legation

eighteen

in Eastern

most cases the Baltic states or Prague.

First,
months

Europe:

in

"The idea of

sending us to the area first was to make sure that we could
cope with the local liquor and local girls, ,,'6'recalled
George

Kennan,

who was one of the first two candidates

chosen.
The Baltic states at that time were miniatures
Tsarist

Russia

and had been part of the Russian

of old

Empire until

'60LongTimers, p. 164; also see: Harper-Boyer
Correspondence
1904-1939, Harper Papers, University
Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

of

'6'RobertKelley,

recorded

at Colloquy,

Long Timers.

'6'GeorgeKennan,

recorded

at Colloquy,

Long Timers,

164-166.

pp.
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the Bolshevik

Revolution.

In his Memoirs,

Kennan

described

Riga, Latvia, where he was sent, as "a minor edition
Petersburg

.

. one of those cases where the copy had

survived

the original. ,,'63The legation was staffed

Russians

from the old American

flood of Russian
everywhere
despair,

nostalgia,

appreciation

and to distrust

a mixture
masked

of

by a

mood of yearning

Conversely,

students

for the

her communist

to gain an

it provided

in which to learn to dislike

an

the New Russia

overseers.

chosen by Kelley was the affable

who was assigned

to Tallinn,

Estonia

for two

He rented rooms from two sisters who had emigrated

from Leningrad .•65 Bohlen wrote
"undoubtedly

followed

'63GeorgeKennan,
Ib;d.
~ , p.

'64

to Riga, and

for young American

candidate

Bohlen,

A

Riga in the 1920's and early 1930's

of Old Russia.

ideal atmosphere

Another

place

by

at st. Petersburg.

and sentimentality,

the city.

was the perfect

summers.

had escaped

gaiety. '6' An ethereal

past haunted

Charles

emigrees

embassy

there was a sense of sadness,

translucent

of st.

in his memoirs

the centuries-old

Memoirs

1925-1950,

that they

style of the leisure

p. 29.

28 - 30 .

'65Charles E. Bohlen, witness to History 1929-1969, p.
10. Note:
Different names were used to identify the same
city by Kennan and Bohlen.
The city was known as st.
Petersburg (1703-1914) but after Russia declared war on
Germany in 1914 Emperor Nicholas II changed the German name
to Petrograd.
After Lenin's death in 1924, the city was
renamed Leningrad in his honor.
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class of czarist

Russia.,,1°O The sisters were

anti-Bolshevik,"

Bohlen wrote,

someday

the nightmare

to Old Russia,

"and lived in the hope that

would pass away and they would

complete

if the future officers
states during

were not assigned
period,

sent there during the summer breaks

the legation,

worked

and for exposure

literature,

Division

and history.

concentration

completing

under an exacting

the students'

was the Russian

sardonic

wit.

Possessed

slightly

indecent

of an esprit gaulois,

166
i d .,
Ib1

p.

10.

167
i d .,
Ib 1

p.

1l.

p , 10

Almost

des Langues

and a

he gave a

expressions. "'68 In

were taught Russian

and economics.

language,

Boyer conducted

"with brilliance

twist to many Russian

the students

period,

first area of

language.

Bohlen recorded,

i d .,
Ib1

the probationary

At the Ecole Nationale

these classes,

168

On

D. C. and

were sent to Paris to study Russian

Vivantes,

geography,

work at

Kelley.

the students

addition,

in order to improve

to Washington,

European

After successfully

Orientales

they often were

to the local culture.

they returned

in the Eastern

taskmaster,

to the Baltic

skills, to assist with the diplomatic

other occasions,

return

with Czar and aristocracy." 167 Even

their probationary

their language

"strongly

history,

all the required

customs,
readings

81
were from "anti-communist"
students,

Norris

B. Chipman,

the Paris program
translating

books.

criticized

for spending

of old Russian

Another

169

of Kelley's

the second year of

too much time on the

texts. 170 B. Eric Kuniholm,

in a

later review of the school's

curricUlum,

the first year's

but felt the last two years

instruction

should have concentrated
Because
student

he was fluent in German,

granted

Berlin's

Seminar

that his studies
historical

more on soviet

permission

studies,

on contemporary

spz-acherr.?"

literary

Soviet

permission

subjects.

literature
the Czarist

169

grounding

and language
universities

bid
I~.,p.1.

in Russian

as a Russian
before

of

and

At one time,
to enroll

Kelley

"No, I don't want you to take those courses.
get the equivalent

171

He recorded

. sov i,et.o1ogy.',173

not

to

Kennan was the only

"basic linguistics,

Kennan wrote Kelley and requested
classes

sUbjects.

to study at the University

fur Orientalische
stressed

gave high praise

refused:

I want you to

history

and

who had finished

the Revolution

in

one of

would have

0

Propas, "The State Department.
.," (Ph.D.
170Frederic
dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1982),
p. 117-118.
17'Ibid.,p. 123.
172In the
1880's Bismark
educate German's diplomats.
Memoirs 1925-1950, p. 31.

173

b'd
I~,p.33.

had founded this school to
Ibid., p. 123; George Kennan,

82

had.

And all this about the soviet Union can come later.,,174

Kennan,

recalling

Kelley's

instructions,

said, "This was the

best advice ever given to me, and it shows with what
enlightenment

and wisdom

that time by Bob Kelley.

this language

students.

had developed

to him.

him.

they were his
him.

He advised

and in their memoirs,

they

They were the sons he might have had and for

their accomplishments
In an emotional

he felt the blush of a father's

moment

at the colloquy

held in Miami

only one year before his own death, Kelley
assembled

Kelley

In time, he came to love them;

in time, with their achievements
honored

between

He was their mentor;

He guided them; they respected

them; they listened

was run at

,,175

A bond close to kinship
and these young men.

training

to remember

pride.
in 1975

asked those

"his boys" whom he had trained

forty-

five years earlier:
May I bring up a subject which I think ought to be
mentioned?
It's a matter that, when I think of it,
I almost start weeping.
And that is of the fourteen
Russian-language
specialists whom we trained and
developed--all are dead except George Kennan
. I
176
thought we ought to bring this up in memory.
Kelley's
hidden,

softer side of sentimentality

however,

174George

and he was better

Kennan,

recorded

was usually

known in the department

at Colloquy,

Long Timers,

p.

167.
'''Ibid., p. 167.
'''Robert Kelley
23.

recorded

at Colloquy,

Long Timers,

p.

83

for the erudite
discipline

scholarship

he demanded

supervised.

and the exacting

from both his students

His reputation

Wiley wrote to Kelley

he expected

and those he

was not undeserved.

in 1932 illustrates

A letter

this point:

Flack and Armstrong were in a state of acute
melancholy as a result of the last informal
comments from your division.
You certainly tore
the pants off of them.
I persuaded them,
however, not to do the swan-dive of despair into
the Vistula. ..
They have both been working
very hard . . . and, as they both have been
really extremely industrious and eager to
please, I think it would not be a bad idea to
find a pretext to give them a little pat on the
back. 177
Kelley was pleased

with the results

"I think the program

turned

[and] was absolutely

indispensable

relations
Kelley

out very successfully

with the soviet Union

later recalled.

of the program.
.

to the development

of our

in those early years,"

"Some of these officers

spoke as

well as any Russian. ,,178
In addition
Kelley

to the four-year

established

specialists

a program

at the United

officers

transferred

European

Division

played

a major

1930's, became

formal academic

to train other Eastern

States

legation

often between

in Washington,

D.C.

specialist

at Riga.

European
These

Riga and the Eastern

role in Soviet-American
a Russian

program,

Loy W. Henderson,
relations

in this way.

who

in the
His

177John
Wiley to Robert Kelley, May 23, 1932, John Wiley
Papers, FDR Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

178RobertKelley
164-165.

recorded

at Colloquy,

Long Timers,

pp.

84

devotion

to Kelley was life-long,

task to write Kelley's

obituary

and it was Henderson's

for the washington

sad

Post in

June 1976.179
As can be seen, Kelley
need for foreign

service

He was able to establish
program

he envisioned,

testified

forecasted

officers

published

memoirs,

Even Russia's

Commissar

in Russian

diplomatic

and fellow officers.

following

the only students

for Foreign Affairs,

was

Charles
to write

of the program.
Maxim

Litvinov,

young men were in many ways better-

history

than anyone

in the soviet

service. ,,180

The program
discussion

studies

of that program

were loud in their praise

said that, "Mr. Kelley's
trained

cultural

and the success

(Chip) Bohlen and George Kennan,

America's

who spoke fluent Russian.

the Russian

to by his students

accurately

was not without

of which diplomats
recognition,

some detractors.

In a

should be sent to Moscow

one newspaper

columnist

wrote:

179Loy
Henderson, "Robert Kelley Dies, Expert on Russia
for state Dept.," The Washington Post, June 3, 1976.
Henderson was assigned to "EE," 1925-1926, 1930-33, Riga,
1927-1929, U.S. Embassy, Moscow, 1934-1938, Counsellor of
Embassy, Moscow, 1942.
Henderson's six-volume memoirs are
as yet unpublished but have been made available to many
historians.

180JamesReston, "Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy
Retires, " New York Times, photocopy of article in Kelley
Papers, Box 9, Folder 9, Georgetown University, Washington,
D.C.
Date of article unknown.
Hand-written note reads,
"Bob-Just want to make sure you see this." signed, "sw"
Reston also writes that "Mr. Kelley was a taciturn
disciplinarian
.
"
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The state Department's career boys are arguing
about the type of diplomat that should be sent to
assist Ambassador Bullitt in Russia.
The bespatted
Personnel Board wants to send men trained in the
neighboring countries of Latvia, Estonia, Poland .
It claims these men know Russia .
Others
claim that these men stationed in these neighboring
countries have been trained under the Old Deal to
hate Russia
ter
The question

of which other foreign officers

sent was not addressed
have been difficult
service

Indeed,

it would

at that time to have found anyone

who had not been influenced

communist

by Kelley's

in the

anti-

bias.

A more puzzling
question

by the columnist.

could have been

of Kennan's

criticism,
veracity,

and one which

was made

Kennan wrote to John Wiley on November

raises

in a personal

some
letter

3, 1938:

. . I think a real effort should be made to get away
from the feeling, that the function of the Russian
section is to give the department ammunition with which
to protect itself against attacks from irate Congressmen
and pro-Soviet elements in the country.
This was the
atmosphere under which Kelley's division functioned for
a good ten years, and some of us have not yet been able
to eradicate it entirely from our minds. '82
This sharp comment
to continue

was made

in the context

the anti-communist

analysis

function which had been an intrinsic
training

program.

if one considers

Kennan's

performed

or not

at Riga, a

part of Kelley's

remark becomes

that the Eastern

of whether

European

more

intelligible

Division

had been

18'DrewPearson, "Merry-Go-Around,"
The Daily
Washington, January 13, 1934, Kelley Papers, scrapbook,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
'''GeorgeKennan to John Wiley, November
Papers, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York.

3, 1938, Wiley

86
abruptly

dissolved

the supervision
occupied

of the Western

that the "Western

was serious
seriously.

SUbsequently,

,,,183

was actively
authorized

to the language

for instructing

training

program,

The term of instruction

between

of the service,

students

with the fundamentals

lUGeorge Kennan,

build morale,

Memoirs

recruits

in

was one year,
was

period.

of the students"

the diplomatic

branches

The school was

standards

at the end of this probationary

Kelley

School

service

failing to meet the required

rivalry

of the

program.

Service

new foreign

hoped that the "common training

too

At the time

of Kelley's

involved with the Foreign

the art of diplomacy.

eliminate

obviously,

to have been

by the Rogers Act of May 3, 1924.

responsible

and anyone

Division,

Kennan was critical

aspects

to

Kennan

'not to take Russia

he, too, appears

with certain

In addition

Division.

Kelley and "EE" had received.

1937-1938,

disillusioned

desk assigned

year, during which time

European

in its determination

shabby treatment

dismissed

European

that desk for one unhappy

he charged

however,

in 1937 and the Russian

It was
would

and consular

and provide

the

of diplomacy. '"

1925-1950,

pp. 85-86.

'''Forinformation on the Foreign Service School, see:
Robert D. Schulzinger, The Making of the Diplomatic Mind,
Chapter V, pp. 172-211; Ellery C. Stowell, "The Foreign
Service School," The American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 19, October 1925, pp. 763-768; For a discussion of the
Rogers Act, see: Ellery C. Stowell, "Reforms in the State
Department and Foreign Service," The American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 22, July, 1928; pp. 606-610.
For
the impressions of two students who attended the school,
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Joseph
driving

Grew, Undersecretary

forces behind

classes.

of state and one of the

the school, welcomed

one of the

"I think one of the finest things

is the building

in the service

up of the great esprit de corps, the great

solidarity

of the ranks, close contact

Department

with men in the field."'·' While this attitude

encouraged

the young diplomats

special

professional

independent

thought

The training

class,

diplomatic

experts

lectures

analysis.

relations

January

15, 1927, thirteen

Russian

experts.

These lectures
of state.

in

were delivered

by

In the case of

and related

Division.

Division,

matters:

use of English

and delivered

European

The

The second area dealt with

from the Department

were prepared

into two categories.

laws, visas,

Eastern

European

as a

it discouraged

with practical

correspondence.

American-Russian

to think of themselves

conversely

was divided

passport

foreign policy

men in the

or behavior.

first area was concerned
extradition,

between

subjects,

all the

by officials

Between April

from the

20, 1925, and

lectures were delivered

by these

Evan Young, then chief of the Eastern
delivered

a lecture

entitled

see:
Charles E. Bohlen, witness to History,
Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, pp. 19-20.

"Russia"

on

p. 6, George

18'JosephGrew, Undersecretary of State, speech
delivered to new students, November 2, 1925, lectures to the
Foreign Service School, 1925-1930, 7 Vols., State Department
File 623, Record Group 59, National Archives of the united
states.
(Hereafter cited FSS)
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June 24, 1925.'88 Preston
and responsible
activities

for gathering

in the united

soviet Regime

assistant

"The Russian

The remaining

1925.

delivered

Involved
Union"

to "EE"

on communist

spoke on "Activities

states"

on January

chief of "EE", delivered

Revolution

The topics

his

of 1917, ,,188
on December

ranged

22,

and

from "The Baltic

(June 19, 1925)'· to "Essential

in Establishing

of the

6, 1926.'87

ten lectures were all prepared

by Kelley.

states and Russia"

who was assigned

information

states,

in the united

Earl L. Packer,
lecture,

Kumler,

Normal Relations

Factors

with the soviet

(January 7, 1926) ,'90
While

Kelley's

it is beyond

lectures

individually,

isolate and analyze
may be divided
Russia,

the scope of this paper to analyze
an effort will be made to

the common themes.

Kelley's

into three broad categories:

the Baltic states,

188EvanYoung,

"Russia,"

and Poland;

lectures

1) history

2) foreign

of

and

June 24, 1925, FSS.

187Preston Kumler, "Activities of the soviet Regime in
the United states," January 6, 1926, FSS. This lecture was
very poorly organized.
188EarlPacker, "The Russian Revolution of 1917,"
December 22, 1925, FSS.
Packer made the interesting point
that "the Allied intervention" was "instrumental in
assisting the Bolsheviks to consolidate their hold
[by
appealing] to Russian nationalism and patriotism." p. 15.
189RobertKelley,
FSS.

"The Baltic states and Russia,"

June

19,1925,

190RobertKelley, "Essential Factors Involved in the
Establishment of Normal Relations with the soviet Regime,"
January 7, 1926, FSS.

89

domestic

policies

the united

of the Soviet Union;

States vis-a-vis

In the history

following

category,

the Bolshevik

"Five new independent
Lithuania

and Poland

entities

he delivered

lectures

"their common danger
"a formal military
there existed
the East,

alliance

"in that moment

distrusted
Kelley's

in these

felt threatened

among these states,"

and in case of attack

of danger
of written

e.g. "During

from

all will act conjointly
treaties. ,,193The theme
states

and for valid reasons.
in his

1922, the Bolsheviks

with great seve r i t.y ;."!"

to crush Lithuanian.

191RobertKelley,
p. 1, FSS.

.,11

"The Baltic States

"The

"persecution

and Russia,"

June

19, 1925,

192RobertKelley, "Baltic States
December 19, 1925, p. 16, FSS.

[II] (continued),"

193Ibid.,p. 16.

1925,

194RobertKelley,
p. 7, FSS.

by

he said,

were very subtle yet are implicit

the uprising

efforts

Latvia,

out of territory
stressed

states

and feared the Bolsheviks

of words,

Esthonia,

was that the newly-established

judgments

suppressed
Russian

-- Finland,

from the East. ,,192While there was not

a "moral union,"

of these lectures

and the World War.

Empire. ,,191Kelley

. even in the absence

choice

Revolution

that the new, struggling

four lectures,

of the Russian

-- [were] all created

of [the] former Russia

of

the Soviet government.

three of which traced the dismemberment
Empire

the position

3)

"Baltic States

[I]," December

18,

90

directed

against

.

.Catholics,"

persecuted.

,,195

opinions.

His research

organization

and "Polish

He did not explicitly

flawless

religion

state his personal

was far-reaching

and impressive,

in its logic, his message

his

understated

yet clear.
The final lecture
an "Outline
evolution

of Russian

History,

of the Russian

historically,

state.

frontiers,

result that, "constant

Revolution

presented

,,199

by

Kelley

with the

was the sine
,,19'

The

argued,

because,

had become

an

which was unable to meet the challenges

in "the carrying

was a thoughtful

determined

of such a state.

was successful,

by the modernization

particularly

195

preparedness

state and social organization

anachronism,

the

He argued that,

seas, or mountains,"

military

qua non of the very existence

"the Russian

in which he analyzed

position, ,,'97 that there was "a complete

of natural

Bolshevik

,,196

series was entitled

"the fate of Russia was largely

its geographical
absence

in the history

of other world powers,
on of successful

war."-

lecture, very much as one might expect

This
from

Ibid. , p. 14.

19'Robert Kelley,
FSS.

21, 1925,

Ibid.

197

I

p. 2.

19'Ibid., p. l.
Ibid. , p. 19.

199

2ooIbid.

, p. 19.

"Outline

of Russian

History,"

December

91

a historian.

Only in the closing

paragraph

is Kelley's

bias

revealed:
Although
. we have a tremendous expansion and
growth of the external power and prestige of the
Russian state, there was no progress in the internal
political, economic or cultural development of the
Russian people, and it was this internal
backwardness of the Russian people that explains the
rapidity and extent of the debacle of 1917.~1
It is of some interest that the thesis
in explanation
towards

of Russia's

her neighbors

This article

the sUbject

Kelley's

lecture

her history,

of invasion

foreshadowed

of historical

and Kennan's

Kennan's

"X-Article.,,202

inquiry

essay argued

at the time, and
for years.

and had suffered

or intervention.

the resources

of the country

of the national
with Russia's

had been

the constant

threat

The result had been that "all
had been placed

defense,,203so as to impress

military

Both

that throughout

Russia had lacked secure borders,

by enemies,

advanced

and hostility

was the cause of fierce debate

remained

surrounded

belligerence

Kelley

strength.~4

at the disposal

any adversaries

The scholarly

Kennan may

2°'Ibid.,p. 19.
202George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet
Foreign Affairs, 25: 1946-47, pp. 566-582.
203Robert Kelley,
p. 1, FSS.

"Outline of Russian

Conduct,"

History,"

December

21, 1925,

2~This was a familiar thesis of Kennan's.
See:
"The
united States and Russia," written Winter 1946, reprinted in
ANNEX, Memoirs, pp. 560-565.
"The Russians, throughout
their history, have dealt principally with fierce hostile
neighbors.
Lacking natural geographical barriers ..
"
p.

560.
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well have arrived
studies,

at these conclusions

and here the point is merely

possibility
diplomats

of Kelley's

influence

who were exposed

delivered

seven lectures.

"disciples

of Marx"

of minor

"slogans
"purely

governmental

as a tactical

communist

doctrine

the Soviet

and therefore,

leaders

of boundaries

jUdicial,

and claimed

and executive

that the

power resided

men, and further

object

was "to insure dictatorship

claimed

that the

in power.,,206 Kelley cautioned

students

grievous

that this government

sovereign

political

sovereignty
legalized
Russian

to conclude"

body deriving

Communist

of those

that it would be "a

its authority

of the people. ,,207The political

the "activities

is

the

in a body of twenty-one

mistake

as

he stated,

movement. ,,205He explained

of that doctrine

Kelley

were used by the leadership

of class struggle

union of legislative,

of

observations.
policies,

for whom the "question

of self-determination"

the

on the future reasoning

He analyzed

importance,"

his own

to suggest

to his sagacious

In the second category,

always

through

is "a

from the

organs merely

of the real governing

power

-- the

Party. ,,208

205Robert Kelley,

"soviet Union,"

June 22,

1925,

p. 2,

FSS.

206Ibid., p , 2.
207Robert Kelley, "Territorial and Political
Organization of the Soviet Government," December
p • 15.

FSS.

205Ibid.

31, 1925,
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The development
Third International
presentation
impressive
quoting

was the subject

Communist
of another

on the Third International
piece of scholarship.

extensively

communist

of the Russian

leaders

own conclusions.

and writings

his students

guidance.

"The relationships

Government

and the Third International
he said.

between

solidarity

of material

whose

functions

to a certain

offered

is neither

"The bond between

interests,

between

from the fact

coordinate

organs
was the

hearings

1924; to wit, that the only real distinction

the soviet Government,

three power was vested
The lecture
explained

the period

fortuitous

are different.,,209 This, of course,

and the Third International

Regime"

soviet

a mutual

but rather
extent

some

the two arises

same point Kelley had made during the recognition
in January

of

the so-called

from the fact that there exists

by

to reach their

Kelley

not merely

that they represented

The

was a particularly

In his final remarks,

nor accidental,"

lecture.

Kelley made his points

from the speeches

and allowed

Party and the

Communist

was in the names,

party,

and in all

in the same leaders.

on "Economic
the reasons

of "military

the Russian

Aspects

of the Bolshevik

for the communists'

communism"

to the period

'O'Robert Kelley, "Third or Communist
January 5, 1926, p. 25, FSS.

shift from
of the "New

International,"
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Economic

Policy"

"Foreign

Policy

two sessions
Bolsheviks'

or "state Capitalism.
of the Bolshevik

and addressed

underscored
soviet

"Although

regime has remained

foreign policy

undergone

considerable

menace

He concluded
and reprisal

soviet Government."
said, "the world

.,

11212

pervades

is divided

modus vivendi

goal "remains

repeatedly

writings

aim of the
revolution

and

-- its
-- has

to reinforce

jUdgment:

the foreign

According

7, 1917,

In this presentation,

with a personal

and while the communist

temporary

Kelley

-- that is, its tactics

again made use of communist

points.

on November

the Ultimate

,,211

in

of the

the same -- world

changes.

on

was delivered

of a whole soviet republic

immediate

Kelley

beginning

came to power:

the point,

the establishment

Regime"

the development

foreign policy,

when the communists

The lecture

,,210

"A spirit of

intercourse

to the Soviet

into two warring

leaders,

Kelley

a

countries,

the same -- world revolution.

of the

classes

leaders might accept

with capitalistic

his

their

,,213

21°Robert Kelley, "Economic Aspects of the Bolshevik
Regime," December 23, 1925, pp. 1-2, FSS.
21'Robert Kelley, "Foreign Policy of the Bolshevik
Regime," December 29, 1925, p. 4, FSS.
The second section
of this lecture was entitled, "Foreign Policy of the Soviet
Regime (continued)," December 30, 1925, FSS.
212Ibid., p , 17.
2"Ibid., p , 6.
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Kelley's
Recognition

third category

concerned

the "Problem

of the soviet union. ,,2" In analyzing

issue, he stated that "recognition"

of

this

held a different

meaning

for the soviet

regime than for the states of Western

Europe.

To the former,

recognition

expedient"

essential

revolution."'"
settlement

states,

of debts, the question
of propaganda.

these conditions,

Kelley

honor their promises.
following

"a temporary

until the "advent of the world

To the Western

and cessation

France

represented

recognition

of confiscated

Even if the soviets

states.

attitude,"

The experiences

those governments'

"If I am correct

which repudiates
activities"

of Great Britain

recognitions

obligations"

simply had not, in Kelley's

to
and

of the
of its

states

with a regime

and continues

States.2"

to

of Soviet

the position

of the united

to enter into relations

in the united

agreed

in my interpretation

he said, the government

"does not propose

property,

felt they could not be trusted

Russia were discussed. 216 Kelly restated
united

entailed

"subversive

The Soviet government

view, met "the acid test of good

faith. ,,218

2"Robert Kelley, "Problem of Recognition
Regime," January 7, 1926, FSS.
Ibid.,

2I5

p.

1.

216Ibid.,p. J-20.
2I7Ibid., p. 26.
Ibid.,

218

p. 26.

of the Soviet
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Kelley's
hundred

lectures

and twenty-one

measurement

is easily

were typed, double

pages of legal size paper.
calculated.

quantify

is how much influence

students

at the Foreign

service

School on the thought

relations
result

the students

and particularly

of Kelley's

School.

he shrugged,

task to demonstrate

The conclusions

What

Kelley

on the Soviets

and the Eastern

states,

of the diplomatic
formed concerning

relations

as a

known.

presented

were the antipathetic

What

to the

views of

Particularly
Affairs

,,219

World-Russian

are not definitely

of Russian

trainees.

because

in the united

these lectures may well have been the first and only

academic
before

When Earl Packer

the impact of the Foreign

Europeanists.

there were few scholars

to

"It would be a

can be shown is that the only viewpoints
trainees

That

had on the

American-Russian

lectures

on two

is more difficult

the lectures

Service

was asked this question,
tremendous

spaced,

discussion

to which young officers

they were assigned

the Rogers'

to the field.

Act, all newly-accepted

were exposed

with the passage

officers

were required

to attend the school,

and since Kelley remained

Department's

Russian

resident

likely that his influence

are impressive

well-researched,

21'Packer Interview,

1937, it is

it must be added:

historical

logical,

the State

was significant.

That said, in fairness
lectures

expert until

of

documents.

and representative
February,

these
They were

of the thinking

1989, New York City, N. Y.
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and the position
nonrecognition
but rather,

of the state Department

at the time.

policy was, after all, not Kelley's

as Kelley wrote,

Coolidge-Kellogg

simply perpetuated

policy.

He was instrumental

in planning

training

of Russian

specialists.

the trainees

who attended

the Foreign

copies

Embassies

and legations

educating

the staffs at those locations

the

He influenced

all

School.

of all his lectures were sent to American

for America's

communist voice.

that

and organizing

Service

Moreover,

possible

policy,

"a Wilson-Colby-Harding-Hughes-

one. ,,220Kelley

language

The

around the world as a means of

diplomats

and making

it

to speak with one anti-

221

****
After sixteen
president
Russia.
Bolshevik

made the decision
Kelley,

to recognize

officially

of

One may be sure that the irony of

did not escape Kelley.

misgivings,

soviet

of the past, ,,222
was asked to draft the

agreement.

this situation

in 1933, a new and determined

who knew "all the dots and commas

documents

recognition

personal

years,

he remained

Yet whatever

silent.

all, and as has often been written,

his

Kelley was, after

"a taciturn

22°Kelley to Harper, March 10, 1925, Harpers
University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

man," and
Papers,

22'Mostof Kelley's lectures are stamped "Confidential"
and are stamped with the instructions: "Copy for Consul at _
To be delivered by personal messenger or other safe
means as opportunity offers; not to be transmitted by mail."
222Samuel Harper,

The Russia

I Believe

In, p. 202.
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now he simply rededicated
American

interests

himself

to protecting

from the soviets.

America

and

CHAPTER V
THE KELLEY-ROOSEVELT
For months
Division

the maneuvers

assistant,

surreptitiously
official
release

confirmed
Roosevelt,

of official
relations"
people

Bullitt,

of October

silence,

between

between

had acknowledged

"the hundred

President

Mikhail

of Russia."

were not "insoluble,"

Kalinin

"the present

The difficulties
the President

any representative

with me personally

sixteen

and twenty-five

only by frank, friendly

be glad to receive

ending

States and the hundred

nations

223

The press

223

20, 1933, which

in a first step toward

people

Secret

America's

their suspicions.

million

explore

promoted

of messages

and his

who had, at first

and Soviet President

of the united

be "removed

and not a little

of the Soviet government.

the exchange
Roosevelt

European

of the new president

and later openly,

recognition

announced

merely

William

on the afternoon

Franklin

of the Eastern

had followed with avid attention

apprehension
special

the officials

CONFLICT

years

abnormal

million

and sixty
between
wrote,

the two

and could

conversations .... I shall
you may designate

all questions

outstanding

0rville H. BUllitt, For the President:
(Boston, 1972) pp. 21-39.

Personal

to

between

and

100

our two countries. ,,224Kalinin' s prompt
past situation
and arising,"

"regrettable."

The difficulties,

the soviet President

only when direct

relations

in the absence

promised

to send Maxim Litvinov,
Affairs,

frustrated

Cordell

which

People's

and, as his friend Harper

conferences"

separated

Commissar

recorded,

Kelley and Secretary

,,226

for

"serious,

private,

the questions

They recommended

any pUblic overtures

as

of State

to arrange

in order to resolve

the two countries.

this be done before

for

Kelley was visibly

Hull had both urged Roosevelt

"informal

" ...can be solved

the situation.

unflappable

well as much excited.

"present

of such relations. ,,22'Kalinin

to discuss

The ordinarily

wrote,

the

exist ...they have no chance

solution

Foreign

reply termed

that

were made to the

soviet Government. 227
Roosevelt

had decided

state Department
the Russians
Clearly,

channels,

and planned

Kelley's

Bypassing

he had communicated

normal

directly

to handle the negotiations

myriad memoranda

Kelley was further
represented

otherwise.

alarmed

because

himself.

had gone unheeded.
Russia would be

by a man whose career Kelley had followed

224FRUS,The Soviet Union,

with

for

pp , 17-18.

22'Ibid., p. 18.
226Harper, The Russia

I Believe

In, 200.

~7Cordell Hull, The Diary of Cordell
293-299.

Hull, Vol.

I, pp.
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years.

Maxim Litvinov

horsetrader,

had a reputation

and as Kelley well knew, that reputation

not undeserved.

To Kelley

228

the future appeared
The united

and the Eastern

question

states'

Europeanists,

long delayed

recognition

of the

of many books and numerous

These studies have tended to focus on the
of why Roosevelt

Some historians

the thesis

subtle warning

chose to recognize

the Soviets.

have argued that he hoped to increase

in order to aid America's
advanced

was

ominous.

soviet union has been the subject
articles.

as a shrewd

sUffering

economy.

that recognition

to the Japanese

others

trade
have

was meant to serve as a

to reconsider

any aggressive

plans she might have in the Far East.

There

support

the validity

but which carries

greater

weight

controversy.

of each argument,

continues

to be the sUbject

is evidence

to
the

of some

229

A question

less frequently

and the one Roosevelt

addressed

posed in 1933, was:

in these studies
Why not recognize

Kelley, "Statements by Litvinov on Matters of
228Robert
Foreign Policy That Are of Interest to the United States,"
National Archives, Diplomatic Branch, 661.44/Litvinov,
M.M./15 No.8.
November 3, 1933.
cited in John Richman,
The United states and the Soviet Union, p. 130; Henry
Roberts, "Maxim Litvinov," in The Diplomats, Gordon A. craig
and Felix Gilbert, editors, pp. 344-377.
While it appears
that Kelley was unaware of the exchange of messages until
after the fact, he reported to historian, Robert Paul
Browder, that Roosevelt and Bullitt "worded and reworded"
the message in order to "insure the appointment of
Litvinov."
See: Robert Paul Browder, The Origins of
Soviet-American
Diplomacy, p. 116.
See

229

citations

throughout

study.
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Soviet Russia?

After all, the official

nonrecognition

had always been repudiated

property,
sixteen

and anti-capitalist

years,

Roosevelt
would be better

unpaid,

and the communist

determined

for

confiscated

Yet, after
the property

propaganda

that the interests

served by official

given

debts,

propaganda.

the debts remained

not been returned,

reasons

had

continued.

of America

recognition

of the Soviet

government.

The time for "negative

leverage

-- the stick,"

had passed.

Furthermore,

believed

that the

"sentimental

prejudice

Roosevelt

against

nonsense, ,,"0 and he certainly
conspiracy

could succeed

the united

States.

recent

inaugural

resolved

address

problems

during

had no fear that any communist

in overthrowing

Roosevelt

between

believed

"the frank, friendly

recognition.

formal recognition.

of the two men who espoused
surrounding

the events

2"Walter Duranty,

between

Kelley

and

should be resolved

and certainly

These divergent

and that

that all "serious

the two countries

prior to pUblic meetings

would be

conversations"

following

Kelley was convinced
between

of

that most

the two countries

This was the point of departure

obstacles"

the government

had said, "The only thing we have

any others could be decided

Roosevelt.

[was]

This was a man, after all, who in his

to fear is fear itself."
outstanding

the U.S.S.R.

before

official

points of view and the actions

them provided

much of the drama

leading to recognition.
I Write As I Please,

p , 321.
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Historically,

the prominence

been fully documented.

Kelley

also having made important
Often Roosevelt
triumphant

and obstinate

evidence

suggests,

approaches

further

followed,
eventual

while

as the

that by 1933, Kelley,

like

to the inevitability

of official

Each man worked
differed

toward

approach

the two countries

In any event,

role was pivotal

The
had been

might have been delayed,

between

the

and their

solving were in conflict.

recognition

have been stronger.

and

is portrayed

implies that if Kelley's

relationship

Kelley's

contributions.

The

their methods

to problem

with

antagonist.

of soviet Russia.

same goal, though

evidence

however,

role has

credited

as the liberal

anti-communist

was reconciled

recognition

if begrudged

while Kelley

hardened

Roosevelt,

is generally

is characterized

protagonist

of Roosevelt's

the

might well

in this situation

and is deserving

of closer

examination.
The six men who planned
shared

at least one characteristic:

statesmen

who possessed

Kelley had perhaps

and enjoyed

he left no diaries

motives

remain

explanation

231

shrouded

the use of power.
personality

and few personal

in mystery.

conference

they were all ambitious

the most enigmatic

because

D.C.

the recognition

and

letters,

Papers,

Georgetown

his

A simplified

has often been given in order to explain

See Kelley

231

University,

his

Washington,
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actions.

For example,

Kelley opposed

nearly

recognition

in 1933.

him in the role of Cassandra,
believed.
opposed

represented

guaranteed

its failure.

a foolhardy

and Russia

This is a heavy charge
attempting

policy

for the uneasy

America

that his actions

they write,

was not his primary

it may be illuminating

father, James Kelley,

to

It has already

He was also ambitious,

goal.

which

ever since. 232

that Kelley was young, brilliant,

and dedicated.

Kelley

relationship

look at the man Kelley had become by 1933.

working

that

for one man to bear, but before

to answer that charge

been established

have cast

and so convinced

Consequently,

bears the responsibility
between

Some writers

that Kelley was so adamantly

the Soviets

recognition

write that

one who was right but not

Others have insisted

to recognizing

has existed

all historians

In a 1933 interview,

hard-

though money
Kelley's

spoke of his son:

Some years ago, it seemed to me that he had equipped
himself for a business or professional career, where
the remuneration would be greater than the army or the
Consular Service.
He listened to me and said that
money was not everything in the world.
He liked his
work in the State Department and association with such
men as Charles Evans Hughes and Colonel stimson,
Secretary of State was more to him than a big
salary.233

232See: Maddux,
Essay, pp. 207-212.

Years of Estrangement,

Bibl iographical

232Boston Globe - October 29, 1933 "R.F. Kelley of
Somerville and West Roxbury is State Dept's Expert on
Russia," copy in Kelley Papers, Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C.
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This interview
associating

with politically

own ambitions?
entered

powerful

service,

advancement.

professor
figure

European

scenes,

provides

aspirations. 234 McGuire,

and one time teacher

in Washington,

of Kelley,

wielded

for eight

ambitions?
McGuire

to

some insight

a former Harvard

D.C. who preferred

but who nevertheless

Division

by Constantine

Thomas J. Walsh of Montana

into Kelley's

men, but what were his

Did he have further

A copy of a letter written
Senator

enjoyed

but by 1933 he had held the

of Chief of the Eastern

years without

that Kelley

His rise had been very rapid when he first

the foreign

position

establishes

was an influential
to work behind

considerable

the

political

clout.
Walsh,
recently

a close political

been chosen

the newly elected

Secretary

McGuire

qualified

McGuire

had
by

wrote Walsh that

to serve as Assistant

of State. ,,235After outlining

qualifications,

of Roosevelt's,

as the Attorney-General-Designate

president.

Kelley was "admirably

associate

Kelley' s impressive

added:

234Constantine McGuire to Senator Thomas Walsh, January
Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington,
D. C.; McGuire apparently left instructions that his
personal papers were to be destroyed after his death;
biographical information on Senator Thomas Walsh can be
found in: James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story The Roosevelt
Years, pp. 17, 21, 28, 33.
25,

1933,

235Constantine McGuire to Senator Thomas Walsh, January
Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington

25, 1933,

D.C.
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•.•as you can well imagine, the gentry who run the
state Department have had him around because they
had to have someone qualified to do what he does-not because of his race, religion, or social
background ....Kelley is wonderfully discreet and
diligent, .•••But I suppose that you would have to
ask for it very definitely from Mr. Roosevelt,
inasmuch as the "white-spat brigade" are banking
upon Sumner Welles to distribute these jobs among
them. 236
This letter was dated January
March

2, 1933 Senator

suppose,

Kelley's

25, 1933.

Unexpectedly

on

Walsh died -- and with him one would

hopes

for being named Assistant

Secretary

of state.237
A clue to what may have been Kelley's

fondest

ambition

was found in a letter John Wiley wrote Loy Henderson
years after recognition
reassignment

and immediately

to Paris from Moscow.

discussing

who would be appointed

ambassador

to Moscow,

ambassador

is appointed;

chance

in assignment

from Arthur
Walton

In the context

"[Bob thinks:]

Bob doesn't

to Moscow

Bliss Lane, Minister

Moore,

assistant

of

When a new

he will probably ...be carefully

of Bob's appointment. ,,238Another

interest

Bullitt's

as the new American

Wiley wrote,

In consequence,

handpicked.

following

three

secretary

think there
example

is any

of Kelley's

can be found in a letter
to the Baltics,
of state.

to R.

The letter

236Ibid.
23'JamesA. Farley, Jim Farley's story The Roosevelt
Years, p. 36.
It is interesting to note that Walsh, McGuire
and Kelley were all Irish Catholics.
2"John Wiley to Loy Henderson, August
Papers, FDR Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

29,

1936.

Wiley
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dated June

18, 1937, expresses

transfer

to the Moscow

Kelley's

interest

supportive

Kelley had perhaps
ambassador

embassy.

in a Moscow

evidence

Lane's opposition

to Russia

These

assignment

is lacking,
aspired

239

reconciled

states'

recognition

only to protect
advance

himself

a confidential

the first

he was pragmatic.

to the inevitability

the interests

that

recognition.

of the Soviets,

the careers

and although

to be appointed

following

establish

it may be speculated

Kelley was not only ambitious,
Having

letters

to Kelley's

of the united

he was determined

of the united

of his friends.

states but to

On January

letter to John Wiley,

not

30, 1933, in

Kelley wrote:

The question [of diplomatic assignments] might just
present itself in the form of selecting some officers to
accompany a mission to Moscow ....Don't forget, also,
that it is not a bad thing to be where the spot light is
playing and after we reestablish relations with Russia
the spot light is going to play on Moscow for some
Iittle time. 240
Kelly was suggesting
officers.
private
problems

that Wiley might well be one of the

Undoubtedly,

conference
between

Kelley

foresaw this "mission"

as the

which would settle the outstanding

the two countries

prior to recognition.

It

"'Lane to Moore, June 18, 1937.
cited in Maddux, Years
of Estrangement: American Relations with the soviet Union,
1933-1941, footnote 22, p. 192. Lane and Kelley had
disagreed in the past over the Russian section at Riga.
This letter was written at the time the Eastern European
Division was eliminated.
24°Robert Kelley to John Wiley, January
papers, FDR Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

30, 1933, wiley
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would be interesting

to know if he saw himself

heading

that

delegation.
There is some evidence
Japanese

in Manchuria

opposition

Russia's
1932,

"Even Kelly

existence
America

between

who was a Russian

unofficial

ambassador,

relations

and the U.S.S.R.

the Far East. "242 Kelley

possible

I

agent of AMTORG241 and
on April

between

letters

the United

from Warsaw

offensive

"the continuation

Eastern

on

must have
he received

reported

Railway"

a

a rumored
by the

of the Sino-Japanese

for American

states of
influence

agreement,"

of the Soviet Ambassador

241AMTORGwas an acronym
Organization.

20,

in a chat with me that the

based on the information

of the Chinese

and the "demarche

and the soviets.

s view of the Japanese

"Japanese-Polish

"expropriation
Japanese,

whose

Kelley's

would have a favorable

been at least partially
from John Wiley,

America

wired Moscow

[sic] declared

of normal

of the

in 1931 may have softened

to cooperation

Boris Skvirsky,

that the activities

conflict"

in Tokyo. "243

Russian

Trade

242Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR [Foreign policy
documents of the USSR], 22 Vols, (Moscow, 1957-77) 1:488-89;
quoted in Nikolai V. Sivachev and Nikolai N. Yakoviev, tr.
Olga Adler Titelbaum, Russia and the united States, p. 103.
243JohnWiley to Robert Kelley, December 14, 1931; John
wiley to Robert Kelley, April 4, 1932; John Wiley to Robert
Kelley, October 10, 1931; Ibid.
Also see: John Wiley to
Robert Kelley, April 29, 1932; March 21, 1932; January 27,
1932; December 22, 1931; October 30, 1931; Wiley Papers, FDR
Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
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The Japanese
nervous.
Duranty,

Russian

clearly were making
sentiment

the Russians

very

was summed up nicely by Walter

the New York Times correspondent

stationed

in

Moscow:
...I'm inclined to think that the line taken by
stimson [Secretary of State] in his letter to Borah was
quite an encouragement to people here and reduced to
some extent their feeling of isolation.
However remote
the USA might be diplomatically, there is no denying a
certain similarity or parallel of attitude between the
two countries on the Far-Eastern question in general and
Manchuria in particular. '"
Kelley was not unaware
relaxation
George

towards

of these attitudes.

Kelley's

the Soviets was noted by news columnist,

Abala on January

20, 1931 in the Washington

Daily

News:
The most conservative of the ultra conservative State
Department clique is Robert Kelley ....Usually he can
spot the pink tinge of a communist a mile away.
But he
didn't even blink when Boris E. Skvirsky, Washington

'''Walter Duranty quoted by John Wiley in a letter to
Robert Kelley, March 21, 1932, Wiley Papers, FDR Library,
Hyde Park, N.Y.
Duranty was a much respected English
reporter who had covered Russian affairs from the time of
the Bolshevik Revolution.
For background on Duranty see:
Walter Duranty, I write As I Please, and Walter Duranty,
USSR.
The letter referred to, is stimson's letter to Borah
dated February 23, 1932 and concerned the draft treaty laid
before the Washington Conference.
stimson wrote, "The
Washington Conference was essentially a disarmament
conference aimed to promote the possibility of peace in the
world ...by the solution of ...problems ...particularly in the
Far East."
Eugene Dooman, Oral History Collection, p. 26,
Columbia University, New York city, N.Y.
Dooman served as
Counselor of Embassy in Tokyo for many years and argues that
if the advise of Ambassador Joseph Grew had been heeded, the
American-Japanese
War might well have been avoided.
Albeit
a partisan view, his history is most helpful in
understanding the Far East conflicts in the 1920's and
1930's.
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agent of AMTORG recently
like an old t r Lend.?"
This columnist,
Kelley,

ideology.

restaurants
Russian

like so many others,

who loved Russians

communist

distrust,

ate in Russian

the double entendres

apparently

possible

in the

felt the same affection

for

had again soured to a state of official

Kelley visited

a month's

stay.

Moscow.

"Kelley

at that time:

realized

misunderstood

In 1935, at a time when the American-Russian

relationship

Russian

totally

Boris

language. 2"

Kelley.

Russians

He greeted

as much as he hated their

He drank vodka,

and enjoyed

The Russians

Wiley

called him.

Loy Henderson

is leaving Moscow

I think that he has enjoyed

made a great
communists

wrote John
tonight

himse1f ....The

fuss over him. ,,247To Kelley,

were his beloved

enemies,

that they could be diplomatically

after

the

and by 1933 he

ignored

no

longer.
Of all the statesmen
least introduction.

Here,

involved,

Roosevelt

it is only important

needs the
to remember

2"George Abala, "Most Conservative of the Ultra
Conservative st. Dept. clique is Robert Kelley .... :",
Washington Daily News, January 20, 1931, copy in scrapbook,
Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
246SamuelHarper, The Russia I Believe In, p. 201: Also
see: Letter of invitation to attend colloquy in Miami, 1975,
Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.:
Harper-Kelley correspondence
1925-1040, University of
Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
247LoyHenderson to John Wiley, November
Papers, FOR Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

91, 1935, Wiley
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that this was the prewar Roosevelt.
York state senator
him assistant
Governor
states

until President

secretary

He had served as a New
Woodrow

of the navy.

Wilson

appointed

He was elected

of New York in 1928, and President

of the united

in 1932.
A bold and confident

possessed
domestic

popular

leader,

great charm and a ready wit.
pOlicy

foreign policy,

he had experience
he had minimal

little confidence

and a plan;

experience,

"wealthy

young men who got entirely

American

affairs.

the mating

journal,

months

particularly

problems

whom he considered

compared

their work

anything."'·

and Mills

of the Treasury]

of the general

no plan, and

out of touch with

Jay Pierrepont

struck Hoover

in the area of

a lot of noise and motion,

to produce

the diplomat,

apparently
secretary

Roosevelt

of elephants:

took eighteen

In the field of

in career diplomats,

,,248

Roosevelt

was his

"with
but it

In his

Moffat wrote,

"What

[Ogden L. Mills,
[Roosevelt's]

ignorance

facing the Administration,

in the foreign

field."'~

- Henry S t'lmson, Personal Dlary,
.
entry of 1-9-33, p.
103, Yale University Library, quoted in John Richman, The
United states and the Soviet Union, p. 11.

''''Will
Brownell and Richard N. Billings, So Close to
Greatness--A Biography of William C. BUllitt, p. 141.
'~Jay Pierrepont Moffat, The Moffat Papers, edited by
Nancy Harvison Hooker, Journal entry of November 23, 1932,
p.

77.
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Members
critical

of Roosevelt's

of his handling

own cabinet

were likewise

of foreign policy

and his total

disregard

for normal diplomatic

channels.

occasions

were later to arise,"

wrote Cordell

the President

preferred ...to communicate

State,

recalled,

better position

Phillips,

Roosevelt's

to negotiate

however,

if the President
was determined

and once his presidency

began to act. 253 The best explanation
one advanced

Under

that Roosevelt

"The impression
wanted

of foreign affairs.
was primarily

to do something

decision.

distrust

Bullitt

he

is perhaps

Packer
striking

the

chief of "EE"
recalled,

"is

in the area
that it

"m.

of career diplomats

as his tutor in foreign

25'Cordell Hull, The Memoirs
II, p . 298.

of

in a much

was secured

I still carry the impression

Roosevelt's

Roosevelt's
choose William

Secretary

to recognize

of why,

I have,"

of this

had not taken

by Earl Packer, who was assistant

at the time.

"when

with the

the wisdom

"I felt that we would have been

the initiati ve. ,,252Roosevelt
Russia,

Hull,

directly

heads of other governments ....I doubted
course. ,,251William

"Numerous

of Cordell

led him to
affairs.

As

Hull, Volumes

-William Phillips, Oral History Collection,
Columbia University, New York City, N.Y.

I-

p. 104,

2"That Roosevelt had made this decision before his
inauguration was well known by insiders at the time and is
documented throughout the contemporary literature.
2~packer Interview,
N.Y.

February

17, 1989, New York City,
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a result,

Bullitt

came to playa

preparations

for the recognition

subsequently

rewarded

Only forty-two
ambitious

of President

Wilson

Bullitt

resigned

Hearing

attacking

Wilson

career diplomats

nature

to Russia with the

and had arranged

and publicly

terms

testified

and the Versailles

for a

Bullitt's

at a Senate

agreement.

Many

had never forgiven him this childish,

engaging

behavior.

company,

close social and professional

relationship.

of Russian

forced to find his own Russian

Roosevelt

however,

and the two developed

to be his "Russian

lacked much knowledge

that Bullitt

witty,

for the truce were spurned.

and unprofessional

chose Bullitt

to Russia.

a winsome

Upon his return to Versailles,

to gain approval

found Bullitt

man possessing

had traveled

Angered,

disloyal

and was

spirit.

truce with Lenin.
efforts

conference

years old, Bullitt was a charming,

In 1919 Bullitt
approval

part in the

by being named Ambassador

and well educated

and a bright

dominant

a

Roosevelt,

expert,"

and since Bullitt

affairs,

he in turn was

expert.

It was in this way

came to rely on Kelley.255

255Forfurther information on Bullitt see: Orville
BUllitt, ed., For the President: Personal and Secret
Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C.
Bullitt; William C. Bullitt, The Bullitt Mission to Russia;
Kelley/Bullitt Correspondence,
1934-1935, Kelley Papers,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. (Bullitt's letters
may not be photocopied as of this date (1989),); Beatrice
Farnsworth,
William C. Bullitt and Soviet Russia; John
Richman, The united States and the Soviet Union, Chapter II;
will Brownell and Richard N. Billings, So Close to
Greatness, A Biography of William C. Bullitt; also see:
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Secretary
preparations

of State Cordell

Hull's

and actual negotiations

suggested

by Roosevelt's

Secretary

of State, Henry Stimson,

who lacked
Eugene

"vitality

Dooman,

design.

described

described

him as a politician

approach

problems,

to international

and that knowledge

Hull as a man

who

was "legalistic"

in his

and "was lacking

which distinguished

in that

such men

and to some extent stimson. ,,257In his diary,

wrote that he told Roosevelt,

"I favor recognizing

Hull made quite clear, however,
conferences

Memoirs

some have

and vigor. ,,256The career diplomat,

people,"

as Hughes

was minor;

In his diary the former

"came ...from the ordinary

flexibility

role in the

that he favored

Hull

Russia."

informal

as a first step.2.

of contemporaries

listed

in bibliography.

256Henry stimson, Diary, entry for 2/25/1933,
pp. 96-97,
quoted in John Richman, The united states and the Soviet
Union, p , 11.
257Eugene Dooman, Oral History
University, New York City.

Collection,

Columbia

2·cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, p , 297.
For a further discussion of Hull's position see: Robert E.
Bowers, "Hull, Russian Subversion in Cuba, and Recognition
of the U.S.S.R.," Journal of American History, 53, JuneMarch, 1966-67.
It has been claimed that Roosevelt chose
weak men for the top positions in the State Department
because he wanted to be his own Secretary of State.
John
Richman, The United States and the Soviet Government, p. 11.
It seems more likely that Hull was appointed because he had
originally, and with some reason, expected to be Roosevelt's
running mate but to secure the nomination, Roosevelt chose
John Nance Garner instead.
James Farley, Jim Farley Story,
p.

25,

33.
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William

Phillips

was Under-Secretary

Roosevelt's

cabinet.

In his memoirs,

"regretted"

that Roosevelt

the Soviets

because

his oral history,
the Soviets.
a Soviet

to

States on the
of Roosevelt

he saved his greatest

wrath

in
for

"We didn't know then that we could never trust
around the corner.,,250

Judge Walton

Moore was appointed

of State following
from Roosevelt's

cabinet

in September

described

gentleman

of the old school,

Another

columnist

novice

at foreign

wrote,

Secretary

of Raymond

Moley

1933.261 Moore

by a society columnist
intelligent

was a

as "a Virginia

and flattering.

Walton Moore, while

"charming

was a

affairs. ,,262Moore and Hull, both Southern

had often worked

together

of their region.

had been roommates

Assistant

the early resignation

bachelor,

the interests

wrote that he

had made the first overture

was more critical

although

official

Democrats,

Phillips

that put the united

"defensive. ,,25'Phillips

of State in

in Congress

Moore and Bullitt's

while at law school,

25'William Phillips,

Ventures

to promote

and during

in Diplomacy,

25~illiam Phillips, Oral History
Columbia University, New York, N.Y.

father
1933

p , 74.

Collections,

p. 105,

261Forinformation on Moley see: Raymond Moley, After
Moley's pejorative
Seven Years.
(New York, N.Y., 1937)
comments on William Bullitt are often cited in studies of
the period.
See:
Ibid., p. 137.
262HelenEssary, Town and Country, February 1936; Drew
Pearson and Robert s. Allen, "Merry-Go-Round,"
The Daily
Washington, 1934 exact date uncertain, both articles in
Kelley Papers, Georgetown, Washington, D.C.
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Bullitt

developed

a relationship

with Moore which continued

for years.
These

intertwining

negotiation

group and, although

the time of Litvinov's
formidable

arrival,

and cohesive

the possible

exception

rely on Kelley
Roosevelt

relationships

turned

was limited,

Roosevelt,

varied,

by

importantly,

a

with

they had all come to

on Russian

affairs.

but since Bullitt's

knowledge

on Kelley.

This

in the summer and early fall of 1933

team prepared

the terms

who was determined

used Bullitt

for recognition.

to recognize

the Soviet

for the initial contact.'ro Bullitt

had been named as Assistant
attended

Most

he too was forced to depend

as the American

the

these six men represented

of Roosevelt,

to BUllitt,

then was the situation

government,

their approaches

combination.

for information

strengthened

the London Economic

to the Secretary
Conference

of State and

which was held in

~3For a discussion of economic reasons, see: Robert E.
Bowers, "American Diplomacy, the 1933 Wheat Conference and
Recognition of the Soviet union."
Agricultural History,
Vol. XL, January 1966; Robert E. Bowers and Jeannette P.
Nichols, "Roosevelt's Monetary Diplomacy in 1933."
The
American Historical Review, Vol. LVI, October 1950-July
1951; William Appleman Williams, American-Russian
Relations,
1781-1947, Chapter 8; for the Japanese factor, see: Joan
Hoff Wilson, Ideology and Economics, pp. 120-121; Edward
Bennett, Franklin Roosevelt and the Search for Security, p.
16. For a discussion of Russian Japanese Relations, see:
Harriet Lucy Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931-1945,
pp. 1-42.
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1933.264 While there he held two friendly

June-July
discussions
meetings

with Litvinov,

between

Bullitt's

representatives

correspondence

conference
observations

also call into question

Bullitt

repeated

Secretary,

cooperative

a remark,

wrote,

Britain

"The trouble

the British

E. Bonnet,
Bullitt

Foreign

of the

should

In these letters,

to a "squirming

George

His

which

and protocol

it was not.

likening

as a rattlesnake."

cut for John Simon,
Bullitt

Plainly,

Premier,

this

Bullitt

representative

of that country,

of decorum

Ramsey MacDonald,

that the French

his jUdgment.

as an official

that some degree

have been observed.

while attending

of his wit and his bravura.

states to the President

suggests

of the two countries.~5

to Roosevelt

is demonstrative

was, after all, writing
united

to smooth the way for future

Prime

eel" and wrote

"is as

saved his meanest

Minister,

of whom

with Simon is that when they

~4Bullitt's successful plan to join the Roosevelt
administration can be easily traced.
See:
Louis B. Wehle,
Hidden Threads of History, pp. 110-115; Orville H. BUllitt,
editor, For the President: Personal and Secret:
Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C.
Bullitt, pp. 17-33; Raymond Moley, After Seven Years, pp.
135-137.
2~Bullitt to Roosevelt, July 8, 1933.
Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1: January 1933-February
1934.
Bullitt wrote, "I told him [Litvinov] that of course
you would require an absolute pledge from the Russian
Government to refrain from all propaganda directed against
our institutions .... " p. 292.
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circumcised
Bullitt

him, they threw away the wrong piece. ,,266

often made rash pUblic

conference.

This was typical

statements
of Bullitt's

result he was little respected
community.
disdain,

But while

As a logical

in the months

conclusion

Bullitt whom Roosevelt

Skvirsky,

Moscow's

Washington,

D.C.

copy of Roosevelt's
instructed

unofficial
Bullitt

to transmit

preceding

recognition.
it was

11, 1933, he went to

Jr. 267to meet Boris

ambassador,

gave Skvirsky

invitation

the

to make the initial

On October

the office of Henry Morgenthau,

Moscow"

in Europe with

of this confidence,

designated

with the soviets.

and as a

in the international

Bullitt might be viewed

of Roosevelt

the

behavior

he was one of the few men who enjoyed

confidence

contact

during

who lived in

an unsigned

to Kalinin.

carbon

Skvirsky

the text in "his most private

and upon receipt

of "a satisfactory

reply"

was
code to

from

266Bullitt to Roosevelt, July 8, 1933, pp. 3, 5, 6 FOR
Library, PSF, London Economic Conference, Box 156, Hyde
Park, N.Y., quoted in John Richman, The united states and
the soviet Union, p. 29. The "eel" and "rattlesnake" quotes
are included in Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs,
Vol. I: January 1933-February 1934, Letter, William C.
BUllitt, Executive Officer, American Delegation, London
Economic Conference to Roosevelt, July 8, 1933, pp. 289-294.
The derogatory comment on Simon is omitted although there
are no ellipses to indicate the omission.
simon however is
discussed and in less than glowing terms.
p. 292.
267Morgenthau, whom Roosevelt had appointed head of the
Farm Credit Administration, was a close personal friend of
Roosevelt's and one of his intimate advisors.
In May 1933,
Morgenthau was placed in charge of Russian trade
negotiations.
In this way he became involved in Russian
loan negotiations.
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Kalinin,

a signed copy of Roosevelt's

delivered

to Skvirsky.

Bullitt

there should be "absolutely
Roosevelt

"should control

publicity"

Roosevelt
Bullitt

and Roosevelt

letters

to see whether
problems
people.

made

on October

announced

the exchange

on Friday,

of messages

October

of the thought

that these

"This is a request

of sitting

we can devise means

together

for settling

When reporters

asked which problems,

at

20, 1933.

it very clear to the newsmen

two great nations,

became vague.

which

18, 1933.

that exist between

,,269

and

a signed text of Kalinin's

did not imply recognition.

an acceptance

and that President

copy of his message

to Skvirsky

press conference

Roosevelt

that

reply be satisfactory.268

in turn gave Bullitt

his regular

Skvirsky

reply was jUdged to be acceptable

then delivered

message

no pUblicity"

signed the original

Skvirsky,

cautioned

would be

the time and form of any

should Moscow's

Kalinin's

invitation

and

at a table
various

two great
Roosevelt

" ...there are a lot of them that have come up

in the past sixteen

years .... ',vo

Although

Roosevelt

chose

268Forthe President: Personal and Secret, Bullitt to
Hull, October 11, 1933, pp. 42-43.
For other accounts see:
Thomas R. Maddux, Years of Estrangement: American Relations
with the Soviet Union, 1933-1941, pp. 15-16; Robert Paul
Browder, The origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy, pp. 116117; Donald Bishop, The Roosevelt-Litvinov
Agreements.
268Roosevelt at Press Conference, October 20, 1933.
Edger Nixon, editor, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 1: January 1933-February 1934, pp. 434.
27°Ibid., 435.
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not to discuss
October

these specific

questions

20, 1933, he had a pretty well defined

problems

which he had concluded

formal recognition

certainly

particularly

European

of pages of reports.

combination

of background

Which

"Problems

the exchange

Division

of Priendly

Relations

should be settled

was handed by Acting

to Roosevelt

to be

a report

,,271

Relations

between

the

prior to the

A copy of this

Secretary

of State Phillips

on July 27, 1933.

The opening

paragraph

and, retrospectively,

of the memorandum

a prophecy.

of all "serious

governments

problems

to Russian-American

Recogni tion of the soviet Government.

removal

had produced

1933, Kelley prepared

states and Russia,

memorandum

of letters,

The reports were a

information,

Pertaining

in the Interests

United

officials,

and analysis.

As early as July,
entitled,

and

Kelley.

and the Eastern

resolved,

problems

state Department

In the months which preceded

hundreds

before

His list fell far short

of all outstanding

failed to satisfy

by

list of those

must be arbitrated

was confirmed.

of the full resolution

Kelley

with reporters,

obstacles"

was necessary

was a warning

Kelley cautioned
between

that the

the two

prior to recognition

if "friendly

'''PRUS,The soviet Union 1933-1939, pp , 6-11.
This
report was requested by Harry Franklin Payer who was an
assistant secretary of state until November 1934 when he was
appointed chief of the Foreign Export Division.
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cooperation"
Otherwise,

between
he wrote,

these obstacles,"
friction

the two governments

"in view of the extraordinary

official

relations

and good will."

experiences

of other countries

government.

"mutual understanding

argued,

the results

America

and only lead to "friction

establishment

of harmonious

obstacle"

"Question

The second

of Repudiated

the Economic
and Russia.

Ib'd
1

World Revolutionary

Debts and Confiscated
of Bridging

.,

was the
Property."

the Differences
of the united

,,273

were ones which Kelley had

studies.

the revolutionary

Ib i.d
1 ., pp. 6, 7, 9.

273

in his

beneficial

and Social Structure

from his previous

272

which

of "the

many times before and the wording

in analyzing

and

The first and "fundamental

of Communist

The first two problems
addressed

Kelley

and rancor."'"

"serious difficulty"

The third was the "Problem

the soviet

to both Russia

and mutually

to both countries.

Activities."

of

of

and common principles,"

in the interest

was the "Problem

of

were established

the three major problems,

solutions

relations"

relations

would be useless

view required

little

"the source

who had recognized

If formal diplomatic

Kelley analyzed

nature

He cited the unsatisfactory

without

States

became

and ill will rather than the mainspring

cooperation

Between

was to develop.

pp . 6, 7, 9.

differed

His one notable

activities

very

addition

of the communists
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"Even when these activities

was the sentence:
constitute

a present

systematic

interference

affairs

menace

of a country

resentment
sentence

constitutes

was inserted

popular

argument

sixteen

years without

economic

in the domestic

activities

had persisted

for

consequences

to the social

or

states.

the repudiated

debts and confiscated
his earlier

Russia

arguments

unresolved

credit to the soviet government"

handicap

"the development

of commercial

and foreign countries.

creative

in the united

finance

countries

and commercial

had prospered.

the united

states were skilled

Kelley

states had suffered

repudiation

and property

listed was six hundred

and twenty-eight

in parentheses

after repudiated

Ibid.,

275

p. 8

relations
this

period,

as

at the art of

between

listed the dollar

confiscation.

but of greater

b id
Il.,p.8.

"the

the two
losses

as a result of debt

($628 million)

274

relations

by

would

In reality

,,275

had not been the case during the nonrecognition
businessmen

of deep

Most likely this

that while these issues remained

of ordinary

severely

,,274

the

to the increasingly

issues, Kelley reinforced

insisting

between

in response

of the united

In discussing

basis

friction.

serious

order,

ipso facto a source

that communist

structure

property

to the established

of a foreign power

and unavoidable

do not

The gross
million

significance
obligations

figure

dollars

was the fact that
were two words:
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"principal

only. ,,276The issue of interest

not discussed
understandably

during

the recognition

sessions

amount calculated

of interest

over a period

to a sizeable

repudiated

emphasized

sUbsequent
satisfactory

would result

he wrote,

"It

of

are not settled
that

in a mutually

settlement. ,,277Kelley urged that safeguards
in the recognition

to American

based on studies

inflicted

insisted

were

during America's

fifteen years earlier.

The third problem
as closely

so that

effect which would be

claims the Russians

due them as a result of damages
intervention

agreement

interests. ,,27.In this instance

Kelley had in mind counter

examined

statement

property

there would not be "any retroactive

military

be solved prior to

there is little likelihood

negotiations

should be included

prejudicial

years would have

that if the questions

debts and confiscated

prior to recognition,

After

sum of money.

In another prophetic

is to be especially

later.

on a debt of this

of sixteen

Kelley urged that the debt problem
recognition.

was

and

would cause major repercussions

all, even a small percentage

amounted

apparently

was one which Kelley had not

in the past, and his conclusions

of Russian-European

argued that individual
276Ibid., p. 8.
277Ibid., p. 8.
27·Ib~d.
~ , pp. 9 - 10 .

businessmen

relations.

were

Kelley

forced to do business
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with a state monopoly
Moreover,

were at a distinct

the laws of Russia,

of justice

and "the communist

is so alien" to other countries,

had arisen,
espionage.

particularly

of the invitation

expanded

each problem.2M

Following

to Moscow,

studies dealing

analyzed

they show the imprint of Kelley's

example,

the word

Phillips

"weapon"

"loans and credits."

terms

Kelley

sent
aspects

These studies had some influence.

of Hull, Moore,

and Bullitt

are closely

reasoning.

For
for

with this, it is

in view of the subsequent

"loans" and "credits"

of

If the

is often used as a metaphor

In connection

argument

and the united

that the terms were used synonymously,
in a memo dated September

Kelley

Roosevelt's

with different

writings

interesting,

that problems

This was but the first of many papers

,,279

announcement

conception

in the area of "economic

sent to the White House in 1933.

several

disadvantage.

over the

states

assertion

to note that Kelley

25, 1933, wrote,

"in the form of

loans or credits. ,,281
The debt issues were the ones which would
the greatest
279Ibl'd.,

rancor between

the two governments.

later cause
The manner

pp. 9- 10 .

28'Foran in depth analysis, see: Richman, The United
states and The Soviet union, 113-124.
Kelley's reports are
listed on p. 263, footnote 13, National Archives, Diplomatic
Branch, No.1
8001.51 W89 U.S.S.R/13-3/4;
10/20/1933; No.2
861.51/2622-1/2,
10/20/1933; No.3,
46'1.11/198-1/2,
10/20/1933; No.4,
811.00B/1608, 10/20/1933; No.5,
361.11/4089-1/2
10/20/1933.
281FRUS,The Soviet Union,

1933-1939,

p. 14.
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in which the preparations

for the meetings

the way in which the negotiations
guaranteed

that result.

decision
concern

to recognize

the soviet government,

was the reaction

of the American

on religious

freedom

cessation

of communist

propaganda

supported

Roosevelt's

the debt issue by signing

of which were to be worked

most probably
payment

which would have allowed

a fresh relationship.
with Kelley

successfully
BUllitt,

convinced

had developed

recognized

the Soviet government
problems.

by Roosevelt

Kelley

bring about a just settlement
personalities
Perhaps

involved,

to start

interest.
team

1933, Kelley had
Moore,

into a war of personalities.

was accepted

outstanding

plus

of his position.

compromise

Roosevelt

of the negotiating

Hull, Phillips,

of the correctness

the

this was not possible

to exact full payment

By November

settled

agreement,"

the two countries

Nor was Kelley the only member
who felt that way.

finally

to agree to a token

But of course,

lobbying

and a

the pUblic

out later.

would have been willing

By

in Russia

in America,

a "gentleman's

had made the

public.

Roosevelt

and

his principal

for Americans

position.

and

almost

Roosevelt

Once Roosevelt

insisting

details

were conducted,

In this instant,

Kelley must both share blame.

was handled

and even
The situation

An unwritten

and Kelley.

without

settling

forced further

all the

negotiations

of the debt issue.

any other solution

Roosevelt

to

Given the

was impossible.

if either man had been free to follow his natural
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inclinations,

America's

new relationship

would have been different.
an agreement
Roosevelt

in private

order to satisfy

and further aggravated

and autumn months
accepting
economic
world.

some token amount

public.

and the ensuing

There was a broader

As it was, the debt
problems

The united

is something

in herself

and a socialistic
planet.

There

America

sixteen

compounded

collective

could peacefully

difficult.

sadness

country

that it took
for the

The anti-communist

which had developed

isolation,

sixteen

enough

of those years made the future sharing

philosophies,

psyche

in the

share the same

years to make that discovery,

had become deeply

of the peoples

these circumstances,
of erasing

at last gained

that a capitalistic

is also a historical

distrust

this diplomatic

coexist

ironic in the fact, that

America

to believe

country

of the same planet
capitalist

for two different

as well as diplomatic

in the depth of a depression,
confidence

both

states was finally

systems to peacefUlly

That was a mental
There

angered

the old fears.

the fact that it was possible

breakthrough.

in

issue at stake during the summer

of 1933.

and political

out

prior to recognition.

have accepted

the American

issue was not settled
governments

Kelley might have hammered

conferences

would possibly

with the soviets

official

and anti-

as a result
imbedded

of both countries.

recognition

years of distrust.

of

in the
Under

had little chance

Neither

Roosevelt

nor
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Kelley

seemed aware of this in November

future Russian-American

relations

1933.

appeared

To them,

promising.
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